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SYMPOSIUM ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF POLAND - PART 11*




Is Poland's 1997 Constitution politically legitimate? If the Constitution is
politically illegitimate, its legal force could be undermined. Opposition groups
have characterized it as "a miserable monstrosity concocted by left-wing groups
and former communists in defiance of Poland's history, heritage and traditions."1
According to Jan Olszewski, a former Prime Minister who currently heads the
right-wing Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP), the new
Constitution "clearly continues the tradition of the communist state." 2  The
Solidarity trade union and Catholic organizations criticized the Constitution for
"generally neglecting Poland's 'national and Christian traditions."' 3 The Polish
* Part I of the Symposium on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland appeared in Volume
1997 of this Journal.
** Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis.
I The Draft Constitution: An Acceptable Compromise?, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Feb. 13,
1997, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws File.
2 Pros and Cons of the New Constitution, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Apr. 30, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. And Andrzej Kierylo, the ROP's spokesman declared the
outcome of the constitutional referendum irrelevant because his party had not the opportunity to
present its views on the new Constitution. Politicians on Constitutional Referendum, POLISH NEWS
BULLETIN, May 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
3 Solidarity to Urge Poles to Reject Constitution in Referendum, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr.
17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; Anthony Barker, Solidarity Chief Demands
Godly Polish Constitution, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Feb. 26, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; Anthony Barker, Polish Voters Give Verdict on Constitution
Dispute, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, May 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File. A Solidarity Senator, Alicja Grzeskowiak, reportedly criticized the Constitution's
Preamble, which referred to God but also recognized the existence in Poland of nonbelievers, for
"offend[ing] the feelings of the Catholic majority." Constitution Preamble Agreed On, POLISH NEWS
BULLETIN, Dec. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
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Episcopate faulted it for failing to acknowledge the supremacy of natural law.
4
And former Polish President and Solidarity leader Lech WalIsa referred to the
new Constitution as a "mistake for Poland;" 5 he publicly announced his intention
to vote against its ratification. 6 These criticisms may amount to little more than
political posturing by out-of-power politicians and parties, but they reflect and
reinforce beliefs strongly held by many in Polish society.7
The process by which the Constitution was ratified has contributed to the
crisis of legitimacy. It was ratified on May 25, 1997 by a bare majority of 52.7%
in a public referendum in which only 43% of eligible voters participated. Thus,
fewer than one-quarter of the electorate actually approved the supreme law of the
land. 8  This outraged opposition groups, who not only questioned the
Constitution's legitimacy but challenged its ratification in court.9  The
Confederation for an Independent Poland filed suit in the Supreme Court to
overturn the referendum results because of the low voter turn-out.1° But the
4 See Zych, Pieronek Discuss Draft Constitution, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Feb. 27, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
5 Walesa: New Constitution is Mistake for Poland, PAP NEWS WIRE, Apr. 2, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
6 Ex-president Walesa Says He Will Vote Against New Constitution, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, May 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
7 For example, Antoni Heda, a resistance figher during World War 11, declared at a rally
celebrating the May 3rd Constitution Day that the new constitution "is against the Polish nation, it is
for atheists and communistic masons." Protests Grow Against New Polish Constitution, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, May 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. However, a clear
majority of the public favored the new Constitution. According to a March 1997 poll by the Public
Opinion Research Centre (hereinafter "CBOS"), sixty-one percent of Poles favored the new
Constitution despite the fact the a number of political parties were not represented in the Sejm that
adopted it. CBOS: Majority for Early Constitution, PAP NEWS WIRE, Mar. 5, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. But it seems as if Poles were more interested in having a new
constitution than with what was in it. According to a May 1997 CBOS poll, only nine percent of the
population claimed to have "good knowledge" of the Constitution, while forty-three percent said they
were "poorly informed" and twenty-seven percent admitted that they "did not know anything" about it.
Opinion Poll Shows Poor Knowledge of New Constitution, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
May 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
8 See Voters Approve New Constitution, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, May 29, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
9 See Opposition Leader Pessimistic About Referendum Result, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, May 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Anthony Barker,
Polish Right Pleased with Narrow Constitutional Vote, REUTERS FINANCIAL SERVICE, May 26, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; Political Dispute in Poland Continues Despite
Referendum, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws
File.
I0 KPN Files Referendum Protest, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, May 28, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
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Supreme Court validated the outcome.ll Ten days later, President Kwagniewski
signed the Constitution, 12 which went into effect on October 17, 1997.13
Questions about the 1997 Constitution's legitimacy have not been limited to
the political arena but have inevitably affected scholarly analysis. The noted
constitutional law scholar Ewa Lqtowska has suggested that the new Constitution
"eludes immediate evaluation" not because of its contents but because of the
political climate in which it was adopted. In particular, Lgtowska points to the
"vilification" of the Constitution by disaffected political groups and the Catholic
Church. Their "'politically induced' disgust for the Constitution is," in her view,
"the first factor to consider in assessing the chances for real constitutionalism to
develop in Poland."
14
Some scholars have actually participated in the vilification of the new
Constitution. For instance, the sociologist Pawel piewak derides Poland's new
Constitution as "a bundle of compromises," which "freezes the present order in
place and hence preserves its flaws." 15 According to piewak, it does not even
fulfill the basic objectives of a constitution:
The division of powers is not guaranteed and short-term political considerations
define the economy, the state, and the administration of justice. It follows, too,
that human rights are not well protected by the state. Moreover, the state is weak,
excessively divided, and at the same time, still very centralized and reluctant to
grant any forms of self-government. 16
Some of these criticisms can be dismissed out of hand. For example, how
can piewak legitimately maintain that "short-term political considerations define
the economy" when Article 22 of the new Constitution guarantees freedom of
economic activity, Article 216(5) explicitly limits public debt to sixty percent of
gross national product and Article 220(2) prohibits the National Bank from
financing the debt? His other complaints are so general or paradoxical as to defy
assessment. For instance, how can the government be, and in what ways is it, at
once "excessively divided" and "still very centralized?"
But ;piewak does not limit his ire to the Constitution's contents; he also
criticizes the process by which it was ratified. Specifically, he contends that
because fewer than half of eligible voters participated in the public referendum on
the Constitution, "the majority of Polish citizens consider the Constitution
1 Polish Supreme Court Validates Constitutional Referendum, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July
15, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
12 New Constitution Signed, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, July 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File.
13 Constitution Takes Effect, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Oct. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. Poland's 1997 Constitution is reprinted in English translation in 1997
SAINT LOUIS - WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 5.
14 Ewa L4towska, A Constitution of Possibilities, 6 (2 & 3) E. EUR. CONST. REV. 76, 79-80
(1997).
15 Pawel piewak, The Battlefor a Constitution, 6 (2 & 3) E. EUR. CONST. REV. 89, 93 (1997).
16 Id. at 93.
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irrelevant." 17 Consequently, he predicts that "the life of this latent Constitution
will not be very long, and... its authority will be recognized by only part of
society."' 18  This assessment displays a certain na'vetd about the nature and
history of constitution-making - few, if any, constitutions in world history have
been adopted by consensus and ratified by a majority of the population. 1 9 Yet
many Poles of various political persuasions appear to share piewak's view.
But the legitimacy of Poland's (or any) Constitution is not simply a function
of who drafted it, who ratified it, and what is in it; another important factor is its
historical pedigree-whether and to what extent the new Constitution's
organizational and institutional structures and underlying philosophies relate to
those of earlier constitutions in Polish history. As we have already seen, right-
wing opponents of the new Constitution allege that it deviates in important
respects from Poland's indigenous constitutional heritage. For example, they
point out that, unlike Poland's 1791, 1921, and 1935 Constitutions, the 1997
Constitution makes no unambiguous references to God. 20  However, beyond
facile comparisons, little scholarly attention has been paid to the new
Constitution's historical ties to past Polish constitutional documents.
This article marks a first effort at placing Poland's 1997 Constitution in its
historical context. As we shall see, most of the structural features of Poland's
new Constitution, including its division of governmental powers, its broad
guarantees of civil and religious liberties, and its provision of various social
"rights," have roots in Polish constitutional documents extending back to the
sixteenth century and beyond.2 1  These historical roots have important
implications for the overall legitimacy of Poland's new Constitution.
17 Id. at 96.
18 Id.
19 The American Constitution, for example, was not approved in a public referendum but
ratified in state conventions whose representatives were specially elected for that purpose. And, in
many states, fewer than half of the eligible voters participated in those elections. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 437-38 n. 34.
20 See Discussion on Constitutional Preamble Resumed, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Sept. 19,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Of course, Poland's 1952 (Communist)
Constitution made no reference at all to God. But then, from the perspective of many Poles, that
document is not part of Poland's indigenous constitutional history; it was, in essence, the Soviet
Constitution adapted to the Polish conditions. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
21 By "constitutional documents" I mean to include not only nominal constitutions but also
fundamental laws that literally constitute a legal culture in a certain era. This is consistent with
Thomas Cooley's definition of a constitution: "[a] constitution may be written or unwritten. If
unwritten, there may still be laws or authoritative documents which declare some of its important
principles." THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 22 (A.C. McLaughlin ed., 1898).
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THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND
In order to place Poland's new Constitution in its historical context, one must
of course have some acquaintance with Poland's preceding constitutional
history.22  This section reviews in some detail the long history of
constitutionalism in Poland, extending back to the middle ages. That history can
be divided roughly into five eras: (1) the period of initial constitution and
consolidation, beginning in the thirteenth century and culminating in the
sixteenth-century "Republic of Nobles;" (2) a period of political and economic
decline during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concluding with the ill-
fated 1791 Constitution, partition, and more than a century of foreign occupation;
(3) the re-emergence of an independent but short-lived Republic of Poland
between World Wars I and II; (4) the post-war, Soviet-dominated People's
Republic of Poland; and (5) the post-communist Republic of Poland.
Poland in the 13th-16th Centuries: The "Republic of Nobles"
Poland emerged from "the mists of prehistory" in the tenth century AD, when
Mieszko I, King of the Polanians (the largest Slavic tribe of the Central European
region), renounced paganism and accepted Catholicism. 23 Thereafter, the Polish
Crown slowly consolidated its control over territories and their populations. By
the late thirteenth century, when Polish society began developing institutions to
limit arbitrary government, it could reasonably be labeled a "state." Over the
course of the 400 years that followed, state institutions evolved into a weak
constitutional system, based on several fundamental laws rather than a single
written constitution. 24  By the second-half of the sixteenth century, these
fundamental laws literally "constituted" Poland as a republic, such as existed
nowhere else in contemporary Europe.
The Polish Kingdom united with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the
late fourteenth century, in the "first example of an accomplished federation in the
history of international law." 25 By 1569, when the Polish-Lithuanian Republic
was formalized by the Treaty of Lublin, it had blossomed into the largest, most
powerful, and freest country in Europe, reputedly without waging a single war of
aggression. 26 Extending from the Baltic Sea in the Northwest to the Black Sea in
22 See generally Daniel H. Cole, From Renaissance Poland to Poland's Renaissance:
Reflections on Mark Brzezinski's "The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland," 97(6) MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming Spring 1999), and Zdzislaw Czeszejko-Sochacki, The Origins of Constitutional
Review in Poland, 1996 SAINT Louis- WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 15.
23 Quoted in 1 NORMAN DAVIES, GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 3-4 (1982).
24 See Cole, supra note 22.
25 See Wenceslas J. Wagner, Justice for All: Polish Democracy in the Renaissance Period in
Historical Perspective, in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE IN ITS EUROPEAN CONTEXT 127, 131 (Samuel
Fiszman ed., 1988) (hereinafter "THE POLISH RENAISSANCE").
26 Id. at 131-2.
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the Southeast, it encompassed 400 thousand square miles of territory and 7.5
million ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse people.
2 7
In addition to Poles and Lithuanians, the Polish-Lithuanian Republic was
home to Ruthenians (Bielorussians and Ukrainians), Germans (Prussians), Tartars
from the steppes of Russia, Armenians, and ever-increasing numbers of Jews
fleeing persecution from east and west. These various groups adhered to diverse
creeds. Unlike neighboring countries in Europe and despite its official state
religion, Roman Catholicism, sixteenth-century Poland opened its doors to all
religious denominations, including Uniates (Greek Catholics of the Slavonic
Rite), Moslems, Russian Orthodox, various Protestant groups, including
Lutherans, Calvinists, Czech Brethren (the Hussites), Polish Brethren (the
Arians), Menonites, Schwenkfeldians, Anabaptists, and, of course, Jews. 28
Six estates comprised the class structure of sixteenth-century Poland: the
Crown (and its dependents), the nobility (szlachta), the clergy, city burghers, the
Jews, and the peasantry. Each estate, with the exception of the peasantry, was
autonomous, exercising independent jurisdiction over its own members in matters
not affecting other estates. The peasants were under the jurisdiction of the
Crown, the Church, and predominantly the nobility.
29
The rise of the nobility and subjugation of the peasantry during the sixteenth
century reflected a growing serf economy in Poland-Lithuania; but class
distinctions throughout the Republic were not economically founded. Castes
were functional. The rights, privileges, and obligations of each estate depended
on the role that estate served in society. Successful burghers and Jews often were
wealthier than the average petty nobleman. In fact, many impoverished nobles
lived in worse squalor than peasants. But this did not impair their superior legal
and political rights. The poorest "petty noble" possessed the same quantum of
legal and political rights as the wealthiest "magnate," including equal rights to
vote and participate in Parliament.3 °
27 Id. at 131; DAVIES, supra note 23, at 215. Poland's population grew to 11 million by the
middle of the seventeenth century, but declined precipitously in the second half of that century as
Poland lost territories to imperialist neighbors. Id. at 24.
28 See generally JANUSZ TAZBIR, A STATE WITHOUT STAKES: POLISH RELIGIOUS TOLERATION
IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (1967).
29 Peasants did, however, exercise "rural self-government." See J6zef Siemietiski, Polish
Political Culture in the 16th Century, in THE POLISH PARLIAMENT AT THE SUMMIT OF ITS
DEVELOPMENT (16TH - 17TH CENTURIES) 54, 60 (Wladyslaw Czaplifiski ed., 1985).
30 Some have argued that, as a practical matter, the magnates' vast wealth bought them
extraordinary political power. See Antoni Mqczak, Polish Society and Power System in the
Renaissance, in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 17; WITOLD KULA, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF THE FEUDAL SYSTEM: TOWARDS A MODEL OF THE POLISH ECONOMY 1500-1800
(Lawrence Garner trans., 1976). Others have argued, to the contrary, that by the beginning of the
sixteenth century the political status of the most powerful lords had fallen, while that of the petty
nobles had increased. See Siemiefiski, supra note 29, at 57. As Norman Davies has put it: "The
Szlachta always insisted on the legal equality of everyone in their own order, irrespective of wealth or
power. They made no distinction between the great magnates, the middle stratum of landed nobility,
or the growing mass of landless and impoverished 'noble rabble."' NORMAN DAVIES, HEART OF
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Government in sixteenth-century Poland was based on "the right of
resistance, the social contract, the liberty of the individual, the principle of
government by consent [and] the value of self-reliance." 3 1 Like its European
neighbors of the same era, the Polish-Lithuanian Republic was a monarchy, but
unlike in neighboring states the King's authority was strictly circumscribed by the
nobility and its base of power, the Sejm.
The Sejm had its origins in the thirteenth century, and by the fourteenth
century had become "vital to the governance of Poland's provincial matters." 32
Its development tracked the evolution of other institutions in Poland. In 1374
King Louis of Anjou granted the Privilege of Ko§ice in which he promised to
impose no new taxes without the nobility's consent. Louis's successor, King
Jagiello, in 1422 pledged not to confiscate property without a court order. Eleven
years later, he granted the Privilege of Jedlna, which proclaimed, "Neminem
captivabimus nisi iure victum" ("[W]e will not imprison anyone except if
convicted by law").33 This revolutionary innovation in civil libertarianism gave
Polish citizens due process-style rights that did not exist in any other European
country for another 250 years. 34 The British monarchy first granted habeas
corpus rights to its citizens in 1679. In France, until the very end of the ancien
r6gime, the King or anyone carrying lettres de cachet from him could incarcerate
any person, even aristocrats, without cause or trial. 35 And Poland's Privilege of
Jedlna provided broader coverage than many subsequently enacted habeas corpus
laws because Poland's nobility constituted an unusually large percentage of
Poland's total population, which was Europe's largest. 36  By the sixteenth
century, the Privilege was protecting the liberty of between five hundred thousand
and a million Poles.
EUROPE: A SHORT HISTORY OF POLAND 297 (1984). This greatly distinguished the Polish-Lithuanian
Republic from other European countries of the same era. As von Moltke wrote, "[n]o Polish Noble
was the vassal of a superior lord - the meanest of them appeared at the diet in the full enjoyment of a
power which belonged to all without a distinction. It is here that we find the fundamental difference
between [Poland] and the feudal states of the West and the despotism of the East." FIELD-MARSHAL
COUNT VON MOLTKE, POLAND 3 (Emma S. Buchheim trans., 1885).
31 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 371.
32 MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND 32-33 (1998).
33 See Wagner, THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 133.
34 Originally, the Privilege of Jedlna was restricted to the szlachta, but it was extended to cover
townsmen in the 1791 Constitution. It should also be noted that social classifications in Poland were
not nearly as rigid as in other European countries, which is to say they were not entirely immutable.
Burghers and Jews were sometimes ennobled. See Siemiefiski, supra note 29, at 58.
35 See Wenceslas J. Wagner ET AL., Laurentius Grimaldus Groslicius and His Age - Modem
Constitutional Law Ideas in the Sixteenth Century, in POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE AGES 97, 98
(Wenceslas J. Wagner ed., 1970) (hereinafter "POLISH LAW").
36 See Wenceslas J. Wagner, Introduction, in POLISH LAW, id. at 5 (estimating that the nobility
comprised between ten and fourteen percent of the total population of Poland-Lithuania); DAVIES,
supra note 23, at 215 (estimated that the nobility comprised approximately seven percent of Poland's
total population in 1569 and nine percent by the late seventeenth century).
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The size of Poland's nobility gave it immense political power, which it
wielded through its political arm, the Sejm. In 1501 the Sejm firmly established
its supremacy over the Crown by exacting from King Aleksander the power of
legislative initiative, leading directly to the enactment four years later of the Nihil
Novi "constitution," 37 which prohibited the King from enacting new laws without
the Sejm's concurrence. Then, after the death of the last Jagiellonian King
(Zygmunt August) in 1572, the Polish nobles abolished hereditary monarchy
altogether. All subsequent kings were elected by an assembly of all the nobles
(the National Assembly); and the vote had to be unanimous. As Mark Brzezinski
has noted, "[t]his procedure precluded the King from possessing any notion of
'divine right' or royal privilege and initiated the principle that national
sovereignty belongs to the whole nation, not to one individual. 38
Before coronation, newly elected kings had to swear oaths of allegiance to all
previously enacted laws, the principle of religious toleration, the convention of an
elected monarchy, the privileges of the nobility, the right of the Sejm to convene
regularly and to oversee the Crown's policies, the nobility's right to approve
declarations of war, foreign treaties, and new taxes, and finally the nobility's right
of resistance should the King fail to keep his word. These oaths were first
codified in the Acta Henriciana (Pacta Coventa) of 1576. From then on each
newly elected King had to swear to uphold the Pacta Conventa, which
enumerated ever-increasing numbers of oaths. A 1609 statute, de non praestanda
oboedientia, established "a detailed procedure (which included three warnings by
the Senate [the upper house of Parlament])" before the King could be removed for
violating his loyalty oaths. 39
By the end of the sixteenth century then, Poland had clearly established the
political dominance of the Sejm and its constituency, the nobility. And the
nobility exercised its power defensively-to secure its own liberties. This is
evident in the "ancient" institution of the Liberum Veto, 40 which established
unanimity as the rule for parliamentary action. A single legislator could prevent
the 236-member Sejm from acting merely by stating "Veto" or "Nie pozwalam"
("I do not allow it"). The basis of this right was the szlachta's credo: "Polska
nierz~dem stoi" ("It is by unrule that Poland stands").4 1
Although legally subordinate to the Sejm, the King exercised substantial
power in the everyday governance of Poland. The Sejm met for only six weeks
every two years, leaving the King in almost unfettered control for the other
37 Reprinted in (the original Latin) and translated into English in POLISH DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE GREAT EMIGRATION: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS 109 (M.B.
Biskupski & James S. Pula eds., Clifford Broeniman et al. trans., 1990) (hereinafter "POLISH
DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT").
38 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 36-37.
39 Wagner, THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 137. This was, in essence, a
progenitor of impeachment procedures.
40 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 345.
41 Id.; see also, Daniel Z. Stone, Democratic Thought in Eighteenth-Century Poland, in
POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 55, 57.
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ninety-eight weeks. Most significantly, the King's estate was by far the country's
largest; he was lord over one-sixth of Poland's land and inhabitants.4 2 The King
was also the "natural protector of the lessor nobles against the magnates, and of
the weaker estates - burghers, Jews, peasants and clergy - against the nobility as a
whole."
43
Nevertheless, the nobility was dominant. Indeed, with so much political
power vested in that one estate, sixteenth-century Poland could hardly be
considered a democracy in the modem sense. 44 It was, however, far more
democratic than any of its European neighbors of the same era. Contrary to the
assertions of some Marxist historians, the "golden freedoms" of sixteenth-century
Poland did not belong to the nobility alone.45 In acting defensively to secure its
own liberties, the nobility also protected, in varying degrees by law and in fact,
the personal and religious liberties of other estates (generally excepting the
peasantry, admittedly the largest estate).
Religious liberties were extended to minorities in Poland as early as the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when laws were enacted to protect Jewish
religious practices and customs, declaring that Jews should not be required to
desecrate the Sabbath, even for judicial proceedings. The law recognized the
Jewish oath as valid in court, and permitted Jewish ritual slaughtering of
animals.46 In 1264 King Boleslaw the Pious placed the Jews under royal
protection, assuring their right to settle and live safely in Poland without fear of
persecution. More specifically, the 1264 law provided that: no Christian could
testify in a case involving the person or property of a Jew, unless corroborated by
a Jewish witness; any Christian who wounded a Jew would be fined and forced to
pay compensation; any Christian who murdered a Jew would be "punished by
proper judicial action" and forfeit all his property; no Jew could be obstructed
from entering Poland; Jews could freely buy and sell anything; and Christians
were obligated to help Jews in need of assistance. 47
Jews had inhabited Polish lands at least since the ninth century (predating the
introduction of Catholicism in 966) establishing separate communities alongside
Polish cities and villages. By a law of 1367, these Jewish communities, called
kahaly were given substantial autonomy to establish their own organizations and
tribunals.48 By the sixteenth century some 150 thousand Jews lived in Poland,
42 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 335.
43 Id.
44 See generally James Miller, The Sixteenth-Century Roots of the Polish Democratic Tradition,
in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 11.
45 See, e.g., Introduction, in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 2 (discussing
and criticizing the emphasis Polish Marxists have attached to "the selfish class interests" of the
nobility in sixteenth century Poland).
46 See BERNARD D. WEINRYB, A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE JEWISH
COMMUNITY IN POLAND FROM 1100 TO 1800 121 (1973).
47 The Privilege of 1264 is reprinted in translation in WACLAW SOROKA, BASIC SOURCES
RELATED TO THE HISTORY OF EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE: A SELECTION 17-19 (1966).
48 This law is discussed in Wagner, THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 133.
Vol. 1998
10 SAINT LOUIS-WARSAW TRANS-ATLANTIC LAW JOURNAL
mostly in and around the larger cities, and they were self-governed by Jewish
parliaments known as waady.49 Jewish liberties in Poland were not absolute,
however. Aside from the continual, unofficial intolerance they suffered from
burghers and peasants, Jews were also legally prohibited from owning land,
taking out tenancies, leasing state revenues, and trading in royal cities.
50
Nevertheless, Jews did own land, take out tenancies, and even refused to pay
taxes under protection of the nobility.
5 1
The nobility cultivated a "special relationship" with Jewish communities for
reasons that were largely economic. Unlike most other European countries,
Poland allowed Jews to establish businesses and engage in various trades; they
were not restricted to money-lending. Because Poland's Jews could become
debtors as well as creditors, the nobles who lent Jews money to start businesses or
trades had an incentive to ensure their well-being. 52 Consequently, when the
King abandoned his legal responsibility to protect the Jews, the nobility became,
first, their de facto protectors and, later, their new legal protectors (under laws
enacted in 1539 and 1549).53 Under the nobility's auspices, Jewish tradesmen
were able to circumvent cumbersome town-guild regulations, and Jewish
financiers were able to lend money at favorable interest rates set by the Sejm. 54
Like other minority groups in Poland, Jews were able to lobby the Sejm to protect
their rights; they contributed to officials and attended meetings of Parliament.
55
In sum, in the sixteenth century, while Jews were being expelled from whole
regions of Germany, Austria, and Bohemia, they lived in Poland in relative peace
and prosperity. With the exception of the "Catholic elite," their situation in
Poland differed little from that of any other group. 56 Indeed, they were not the
only minority group to prosper under the political reign of the nobility. The
szlachta became the guarantors of religious liberty for all parties in Poland
throughout the Renaissance and into the Counter-Reformation.
Every law the Sejm enacted which protected religious or civil liberty had its
roots in the nobility's struggle to retain its own political rights. The szlachta
resisted every call for religious persecution out of fear that legally sanctioned
intolerance might result in increased royal authority at their expense. 57 But their
motivations were not only political and economic; a real streak of libertarianism
runs through their writings. For example, Jan Zamoyski, Chancellor of the Polish
Crown in the sixteenth century (during the reign of King Stefan Batory), wrote, "I
49 See Jerzy Ktoczowski, Some Remarks on the Social and Religious History of 16th-Century
Poland, in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 96, 106.
50 See WEINRYB, supra note 46, at 121-3.
51 See DAVIES, supra note 23, at 213.
52 See WEINRYB, supra note 46, at 131.
53 While this change was generally favorable for the Jews, it did give some "capricious or cruel
lords ... a virtually free hand to oppress their Jews at will." Id. at 112, 120.
54 Id. at 59, 129-30, 157; DAVIES, supra note 23, at 213.
55 WEINRYB, supra note 46, at 148-49.
56 Id. at 114, 157.
57 TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 122.
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would give half my life if those who have abandoned the Roman Catholic Church
should voluntarily return to its pale; but I would prefer giving all my life than to
suffer anybody to be constrained to do it, for I would rather die than witness such
an oppression." 58 Even the King, Zygmunt August (the last of the Jagiellonian
dynasty), exemplified the religious tolerance of his time when he wrote, "I am not
king of your consciences. I wish to be monarch equally of the sheep and of the
goats. I am afraid of tearing wheat as well as tares." 59
Poland had been officially Catholic since the tenth century, but while other
Catholic countries were persecuting their religious minorities and executing
dissidents (especially during the Reformation), Poland consistently permitted its
minorities and dissidents to pursue their own religious beliefs and practices
unhindered. In the eighteenth century, the French Catholic Rulhiere wrote of
sixteenth-century Poland: "This country, which in our day we have seen divided
on the pretext of religion, is the first state in Europe that exemplified tolerance. In
this state, mosques arose between churches and synagogues." 60 Indeed, in 1616
there were more than 100 mosques in Poland.6 1
Religious toleration was not only official policy in sixteenth-century Poland;
it was the law, codified in the 1573 Warsaw Confederation, reputed to be the first
document in European history to constitutionalize religious toleration. 62  It
provided:
because there is not a small dissension in our country in the matter of the Christian
religion, we should like to prevent any harmful sedition that could develop among
the people for this reason. What we see in other kingdoms, we promise to all on
our behalf and for our successors, for eternity, under oath, faith, honor, and our
conscience, that no matter who the dissidents from the religion [Roman
Catholicism] are, we shall preserve peace among us, and not shed blood for
difference in religion or in Church observance. We shall not penalize ourselves
for this reason by confiscation of landed estates, by punishment of honor, by
imprisonment or exile. We also promise not to help in any way the authorities or
officers in such a procedure. We all shall be obliged to oppose the shedding of
blood, even if anyone would want to do this for a good reason, under the pretext
of a decree or of any court procedure....
•.. We have promised for ourselves and for our descendants to seriously respect
and to preserve all those matters under the authority of our faith, honor and
58 Quoted in WACLAw LEDNICKI, LIFE AND CULTURE OF POLAND AS REFLECTED IN POLISH
LITERATURE 47 (1944). Zamoyski had received his doctorate in law at Padua, and subsequently
served as rector of the law school there. He later founded his own Aristotelian Academy in his home
town of Zamot. See Robert 1. Frost, "Liberty without License?" The Failure of Polish Democratic
Thought in the Seventeenth Century, in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 29, 39.
59 Quoted in LEDNICKI, supra note 58, at 47-8.
60 Quoted in id.
61 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 190.
62 See Miller, supra note 44, at 21.
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conscience. And we shall stand up against anyone who would like to oppose
peace and to spoil public order; we shall stand up against him for his perdition.6 3
These guarantees applied officially only to the nobility but nevertheless
resulted in a degree of religious freedom in Poland found nowhere else in
Renaissance or Reformation Europe (with the possible exception of
Transylvania). And although religious freedom was not legally extended to the
lesser estates, they too benefited from the pervasive spirit of toleration that the
Warsaw Confederation exemplified. Throughout the entire sixteenth century,
only two persons in Poland lost their lives for their religious beliefs as a result of
legal proceedings. 64
Despite its pious and philosophical language, the aims of the Warsaw
Confederation were largely political. It represented the nobility's anti-clericalism,
rooted .in fear of absolute monarchy. Hence, the Warsaw Confederation's
underlying theme: "let no one try to upset the political balance of the country on
allegedly religious grounds." 65  But the Confederation also represented the
nobility's sincere and oft-expressed desire for peace in the country. As one
signatory, the Catholic Bishop Francis Krasiiski, explained, the Warsaw
Confederation was not opposed to religion generally nor the "true faith" in
particular; "[iut merely substituted for the greater evil of war and bloodshed the
lesser one of granting the dissidents certain rights." 66 What gave this argument
weight was the fact that the nobility was divided among itself on the subject of
religion.
During the Reformation a great many Polish noblemen converted to
Calvinism, Lutheranism, Polish Antitrinitarianism, and the Czech Brethren. 67 At
one point in officially Catholic Poland, Roman Catholics did not even command a
majority in the Sejm.68 Religious conflict would have pitted noble against noble,
to the advantage of the Crown. But the szlachta's caste solidarity was too strong
to permit this, as exemplified in Piotr Myszkowski's famous appeal to the Sejm of
1565: "Rozumienie r62ne Pisma wictego niech milo6ci nie targa migdzy nami"
("Let not the different understanding of the [Sacred] Scripture shatter the love
between us"). 69 The nobility understood that they all had more to lose from
religious conflict than any fraction of them stood to gain.
Despite the Warsaw Confederation and the nobility's self-interested policy of
toleration, there was, of course, religious persecution in sixteenth-century Poland,
63 Quoted in SOROKA, supra note 47, at 45-46. A complete version of the Warsaw
Confederation is reprinted in (the original Latin) and translated into English in POLISH DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 131.
64 TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 117.
65 Id. at 99.
66 Quoted in id. at 148.
67 Id. at 54. Calvinism proved especially attractive to nobles because it "admitted the right of
opposition against royal authority. .. , though to be exercised not by individuals but by their lawful
representatives." Id. at 56. Thus, Calvin supported the nobility against both Crown and peasantry.
68 WAGNER, THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 138.
69 Quoted in TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 50, 117, 121.
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though not to the same extent as in other European countries of the same era.
Officially-sanctioned persecution was less common than unofficial intolerance.
And in virtually every case where persecution was officially-sanctioned, it went
unenforced. In the 1520s, for example, King Zygmunt August prohibited the
propagation of Lutheranism in Poland under penalty of death, but his edict was
never enforced.7 ° In 1552 the King extended the jurisdiction of the-Catholic
clergy to cases of heresy, but he immediately suspended this grant of jurisdiction
and later abrogated it entirely (in 1562-3).71 Perhaps he was persuaded by his
commander of the royal armies, Jan Tarnowski, who argued in 1552 against
ecclesiastical jurisdiction: "Cases of heresy ... should be tried in the senate in full
view of the whole nation, not in a bishop's cellar, under Polish, not Roman law."
Stressing his own attachment to the Catholic Church, Tarnowski wrote, "[t]his is
not a matter of faith, but of liberties which your court violated." 72 Even the most
fanatical of Poland's Catholic writers, Piotr Skarga, acquiesced in the general
atmosphere of tolerance. For all his polemics against heretics, Skarga repudiated
violent methods: "Heresy is bad, but our neighbors and good brothers sharing our
love of the country know that nothing won by force is durable, that anything
secured under duress does not last long." 73
With freedom of religion in sixteenth-century Poland came substantial
freedom of expression. Intellectuals from throughout Europe flocked to Poland,
knowing that there they could freely express and publish their views. In 1561
Bonifacio d'Oria, a religious exile living in Poland, wrote of his adopted
country's virtues to a colleague in Italy: "You could live here in accordance with
your ideas and preferences, in great, even the greatest freedoms, including writing
and publishing. No one is a censor here." 74 This was an exaggeration. There
was official censorship in Poland dating from the introduction of printing. But in
the sixteenth-century, censorship was only sporadic and, more often than not,
ignored without consequence.
Dissident publishing houses arose throughout the Polish-Lithuanian
Republic, producing everything from Bibles written in the vernacular to polemics
against the Catholic Church, with little state interference. 75 In 1551 Church
censors attempted to suppress Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski's classic, De Republica
Emendanda, which advocated, among other things, 76 reform of the Church.
70 Id. at 42.
71 Id. at 65, 68, 82.
72 Id. at 64.
73 Quoted in id. at 149.
74 Quoted in id. at 133.
75 Id. at 140, 144.
76 In addition to church reform, Frycz Modrzewski's De Republica Emendanda advocated the
improvement of the state through reform of customs, laws, and education. Strongly influenced by
Erasmus, Frycz Modrzewski attacked the unwise, inane, and grossly inequitable political and social
customs of his own country. In particular, he took on his own class, the ruling szlachta. Just as the
Polish nobility denied the inbom superiority of kings, so Frycz Modrzewski rejected the inbom
superiority of the nobility in calling for a state, governed by men distinguished by merit rather than
Vol. 1998
14 SAINT LOUIS-WARSAW TRANS-ATLANTIC LAW JOURNAL
Despite their efforts, the book was widely available in Poland by 1554. Andrzej
Frycz Modrzewski shrewdly dedicated it to King Zygmunt August, who declared
that its author should not be punished.77  An index of banned books was
published for the first time in Poland only in the seventeenth century, and it too
was rarely enforced. When it was enforced, books were never destroyed; instead,
they were placed in a special closed section of the Jagiellonian University library
in Krak6w.7 8 Until 1627, no Polish noble was punished for publishing a heretical
tract, and no writer or publisher ever forfeited his life. 7
9
The pervasive freedom of expression and conscience in sixteenth-century
Poland created an atmosphere of great intellectual ferment. Poland became a
premier center of knowledge and learning as religious and intellectual exiles
immigrated there to avoid the persecution they suffered elsewhere in Europe.
They joined native intellectuals, including Copernicus, the poet Jan Kochanowski,
Frycz Modrzewski, and Wawrzyniec Golicki.
Go~licki, in particular, personified Poland's "Republic of Nobles." He was a
son of the nobility, born near Plock, and educated in Krak6w, Padua, and
Bologna, from whose university he received a doctorate in civil and canon law in
1566. After completing his education, Go~licki travelled to Rome, where he
wrote the book that brought him fame across Europe: De Optimo Senatore ("The
Accomplished Senator," first published in Venice in 1568).80 Golicki later
served as Chancellor of Poland and as Bishop of Poznafi, which position he held
when he died in 1607.81
birth. As merit required education, Frycz Modrzewski became the first of the Humanists to call for
secular control of schools and education directed toward public service. Modrzewski also argued in
De Republica Emendanda for the abolition of serfdom, equality before the law, and the mediation of
international conflicts instead of war. His work was highly influential with the likes of Grotius, Bayle,
and de Real. See Waldemar Vois6, Polish Renaissance Political Theory: Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski,
in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 174, 175.
77 TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 139. See also Siemiefiski, supra note 29, at 61.
78 TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 143.
79 Id. at 144.
80 For a recent translation of this work from the original Latin, see WAWRZYNIEC GRZYMALA
GOSLISKI, THE ACCOMPLISHED SENATOR (Kenneth Thompson trans., 1992). A facsimile of a 1598
English translation of De Optima Senatore is reprinted in WITOLD CHWALEWIK, ANGLO-POLISH
RENAISSANCE TEXTS (1968). However, the accuracy of the 1598 translation has been disputed. See
W.J. STANKIEWICZ, THE ACCOMPLISHED SENATOR OF LAURENTIUS GOSLICIUS 11-12 (1946); Teresa
Baluk-Ulewiczowa, The Senator of Wawrzyniec GoJI1icki and the Elizabethan Counsellor, in THE
POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 258, 265-72. Oddly, Go~icki's book was not translated into
Polish before the present century. See H.E. Tytus Filipowicz, The Accomplished Senator, in 26
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMER. SOC. INT'L L. 234, 234 (1932).
81 For biographical information about Goglicki see Wagner, Polish Law, supra note 35, at 105-
08.
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Goglicki intended De Optimo Senatore as a primer on good government, 82
but it turned out to be an original and influential work of political philosophy.
Presaging the Enlightenment, Goglicki equated godliness with reason and reason
with law. 83 He argued for the rule of law as a constraint on both Parliament and
the Crown. And he asserted in no uncertain terms the ultimate sovereignty of the
people:
Sometimes a People, justly provoked and irritated by the Tyranny and Usurpations
of their Kings, take upon themselves the undoubted Right of vindicating their own
Liberties; and by a well-formed Conspiracy, or by open Arms, shake off the Yoke,
drive out their Lords and Masters, and take the Government entirely into their own
Hands.
84
An unfamiliar reader might suppose that these words were written two
hundred years later by Thomas Jefferson. Indeed, intellectual historians have
attempted to trace a direct line of influence from Goglicki, through Father
Bellarmine and Algernon Sydney, to Jefferson. 85 However, a direct connection
between De Optimo Senatore and the American Declaration of Independence
remains doubtful. Yet, there is no doubting that Goglicki's work made quite a
splash in England when an anonymous (and not very careful) translation appeared
in London in 1598.86 The book became immensely popular among forces
82 Such primers, known as specula or "mirrors," were quite popular during the Renaissance,
Machiavelli's The Prince being a prime example of the genre. See Baluk-Ulewiczowa, supra note 80,
at 258-59.
83 GOSLISKI, supra note 80, at xxix.
84 Id. at 32-33. According to Filipowicz, supra note 80, at 238, this was the "earliest statement
in a political treatise of the right of revolution." It should be pointed out, however, that Goglicki
defined the term "People" narrowly to exclude "a Mix'd Multitude of Rusticks, Boors, and
Mechanicks, the Mob and Rabble, the Scum and Less of a Country." Goglicki defined the "People" as
"a Regular Body of Citizens and Subjects, generous by Birth, civilized by Education, and every way
duly qualified to fill the Publick Offices of a State, whenever they shall be legally Invited and
Advanced thereto." GOSLISKI, supra note 80, at 38. Consistent with the prevailing Aristotelian
political philosophy of sixteenth-century Poland, Goglicki plainly preferred republican to democratic
government. See generally Frost, supra note 58.
85 See generally id. and Wagner, Polish Law, supra note 35.
86 Queen Elizabeth herself may have been acquainted with the book. See Baluk-Ulewiczowa,
supra note 80, at 273. And William Shakespeare certainly read it. Indeed, when the English
translation of Golicki's book first appeared, Shakespeare was working on his masterpiece, Hamlet.
Apparently, Go~licki's book induced Shakespeare to greatly expand the role of the King's Counsellor
in Hamlet and to give him the name Polonius ("A Pole" in Latin). See Israel Gollancz, Some
Observations on Shakespearian Names- 'Shylock', 'Polonius', 'Malvolio' in A BOOK OF HOMAGE TO
SHAKESPEARE 170, 174-5 (Israel Gollancz ed., 1916); see also, Filipowicz, supra note 80, at 239-40.
Of course, Polonius was an object of ridicule in Hamlet. An English Shakespeare scholar has
suggested that Shakespeare's intent was also to ridicule Golicki's work. But a Polish Shakespeare
scholar, citing textual similarities between Go~licki's book and Hamlet, argues that Shakespeare
merely adapted to his own purposes Goglicki's derogatory description of a common type of inferior
counselor. Compare VII NARRATIVE AND DRAMATIC SOURCES OF SHAKESPEARE 44-45 (Geoffrey
Bullough ed., 1973) and CHWALEWIK, supra note 80, at 96.
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opposed to the Tudor monarchy; it was widely quoted and cited in opposition
pamphlets and leaflets during the period leading up to the British Civil Wars of
the 1640s.87
More importantly, De Optimo Senatore reflected the prevalent political
philosophy of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic in the second-half of the sixteenth
century: it affirmed the sovereignty of the "people" 88 and limited government
under the rule of "transcendent" law. 89 Goglicki's writings both reflected and
propagated Poland's libertarian constitutional system-a system with well-
established institutions and a well-defined political philosophy. Though
sixteenth-century Poland had no single document called "Constitution," it was
nonetheless a constitutional republic.
Poland in the 17th-18th Centuries: Political and Economic Decline, the
1791 Constitution, and Partition
Without doubt the most revered legal/political document in Polish history is
the May 3, 1791 Constitution. It represents for most commentators "the
blossoming of constitutional government in Poland." 90 Its date of adoption
continues to be celebrated as Constitution Day in Poland. But this has less to do
with the Constitution's merits than what it represents for the nation: a statement of
the Polish state's principles on the brink of its dismemberment by foreign powers.
On its merits, the 1791 Constitution was, indeed, a remarkable document for
its time- the first written constitution in modem European history and the second
in modem world history. But it also marked a retreat from many of the civil and
religious libertarian principles that had characterized sixteenth-century Poland.
Between the' end of the sixteenth century and the enactment of the 1791
Constitution, political'and economic conditions in Poland deteriorated. As Mar
Brzezinski has written, "the important, but unrefined, constitutional reforrnis
developed
. 
in Poland during. the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries became
distorted in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, leading to an
inefficient and ineffective Polish government." 9 1 According to the standard
historical account, the cause of this "distort[ion]" was Poland's increasingly
uhbalanced power structure, as the nobility curtailed the King's authority and
limited state power to such an extent that the Polish-Lithuanian Republic was
paralyzed, unable to defend itself against the growing power of foreign
aggressors. 92  From the end of the sixteenth century to the middle of the
eighteenth century, Poland lost half its territory to Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and
87 See Filipowicz, supra note 80, at 239.
88 On Goglicki's conception of the "People," see supra note 84.
89 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 35-36.
90 Id. at 39;,see, e.g., Zbigniew Szczska, The Fundamental Principles Concerning the Political
System of the 3 May, 1791 Government Statute, in CONSTITUTION AND REFORM IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY POLAND 287 (Samuel Fiszman ed., 1997).
91 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 39.
92 See, e.g., id.
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Austria-Hungary. In 1795, Poland "vanished completely" from the map of
Europe, not to re-appear as an independent state until the end of World War 1.93
As the Polish state came under increasing foreign domination during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nationalism emerged as an almost natural
defensive mechanism. According to a nineteenth-century adage, a "nation" is a
group of people who combine a common mistake about shared ancestry with
animosity towards "others." But there is more than one kind of nationalism.
Hans Kohn distinguished two types of nationalism, which he labeled "western"
and "eastern." Western-style nationalism is a relatively benign variety, based on
shared political heritage. The eastern variety is a more menacing cultural or
ethnic nationalism, based on shared language or, as the old -adage has it, "a
common mistake about shared ancestry." 94 These two forms of nationalism are
not different in kind; they represent widely separated points. on a single
continuum.
Poland moved from the "western" toward the "eastern" end on that
continuum between 1650 and the end of the eighteenth century. As it did,
traditional civil and religious liberties were eroded. The Polish state grew less
tolerant of "non-Poles" (specifically, Jews) and religious dissidents. Freedom of
speech and religion were restricted. Ironically, this took place in Poland just as
other European countries moved towards the increased liberalism of the
Enlightenment.
As Poland entered the Enlightenment era, western-style nationalism
developed as a benign attribute of popular sovereignty, i.e., the right of "a people"
to govern themselves. This idea had been common currency in sixteenth-century
Poland, as exemplified in Goglicki's De Optimo Senatore.95 Unfortunately, by
the middle of the eighteenth century the Polish state had atrophied and Poland's
neighbors, particularly Russia, asserted ever-increasing influence over its
domestic affairs. In this period, with partition of the country looming, Polish
nationalism began to take on the more malignant' ethnic and xenophobic features
of eastern-style nationalism. As we shall see, some of these features are evident
in the 1791 Constitution itself.
Meanwhile, many of the 1791 Constitution's more progressive features, such
as legislative superiority, habeas corpus (which the 1791 Constitution extended to
all property owners), religious liberty, and Article 'V,'s declaration 'thai all power
epianates from the will of the people, were rooted in sixteenih-century legislation
and the legal/political theories of Frycz Modrzewski, Goglicki, and others.
93 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 24.
94 See HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY IN ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND
7-8 (1944). Andrzej Walicki has criticized Kohn's dichotomy between (benign) "western" and
(malign) "eastern" nationalism, but he does so by showing how Poland moved from the western to the
eastern variety during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. ANDRZEJ WALICKI, THE
ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN NATIONHOOD: POLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM
NOBLE REPUBLICANISM TO TADEUSZ Ko CIUSZKO 74-75, 112-113 (1989).
95 See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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Even the idea of decentralizing state power was not an innovation of Poland's
1791 Constitution. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all nobles
participated in sejmiki (provincial assemblies) which elected deputies to the Seim
(National Assembly). They did not send their deputies to Warsaw with
plenipotentiary powers, but compelled them to follow instructions that were often
quite detailed. Upon returning home from a biennial six-week meeting of the
Sejm, deputies were required to report to their sejmiki on deliberations and actions
taken in Warsaw. If a deputy was found to have deviated from his instructions,
the sejmik would often refuse to implement the Sejm's enactments. "Thus
ultimate political control remained at the local level."'96 If anything, Poland's
system of government prior to the 1791 Constitution was already overly
decentralized.
97
Ironically, many of the truly novel ideas of the 1791 Constitution - the true
products of Poland's "Enlightenment"-appear regressive in light of Poland's
earlier constitutional history. These regressive ideas included the reinstitution of
hereditary monarchy, voting restrictions that disenfranchised hundreds of
thousands of nobles, and restrictions on religious freedoms.
The first article of Poland's 1791 Constitution is often pointed to as a
hallmark of progressive liberalism, guaranteeing freedom of religion to all
citizens of Poland.98 But it often goes unnoticed that Article I expressly limited
this guarantee to practices "accord[ing to] the laws of the land." 99 Thus, the
Constitution guaranteed only as much freedom of religion as state policy
sanctioned. Such an empty guarantee was worthy of Poland's infamous
Communist Constitution of 1952.100 Moreover, the 1791 Constitution reversed
sixteenth-century Poland's tradition of religious tolerance and, in effect,
abrogated the 1573 Warsaw Confederation by prohibiting dissidence. Article I
provided: "Passage from the dominant religion [Roman Catholicism] to any other
confession is forbidden under penalties of apostasy."' 0 1 In addition, Article III of
the 1791 Constitution incorporated in full the Cities Act, enacted earlier that year
by the Sejm, which, among other things, limited habeas corpus protections, and
denied non-Christians (particularly Jews) citizenship in the royal cities. This
marked a fundamental change in official Polish-Jewish relations, and reflected the
rise of anti-Semitism among the higher estates (the Crown and szlachta). Finally,
the Constitution marked the end of unity among the nobility, as "roughly 400,000
propertyless nobles lost their political rights and declined to the status of free
96 Frost, supra note 58, at 48.
97 As Frost notes, "the representative principle which underlies all modem democratic systems
was actively resisted in favor of delegation." Id.
98 See, e.g., BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 44.
9 POL. CONST. (1791), art. 1, reprinted in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at
168, 169.
100 On the 1952 Constitution, see infra notes 137-149 and accompanying text.
101 POL. CONST. (1791), art. 1.
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citizens in either the burgher or peasant estate depending on residence and
occupation." 1
02
These more regressive, anti-democratic, and anti-libertarian features of
Poland's 1791 Constitution reflected the domestic political and legal theories of
the day, which had grown increasingly nationalistic since the close of the
sixteenth century. For example, Father Hugo Kotl4taj, "[a] leading member of the
Polish Enlightenment" and "a major architect of the May 3, 1791
Constitution,"'10 3 respected the rights of religious minorities to live in Poland but
not necessarily to follow their religious practices. He wrote that "[a]ll Jews
permanently or temporarily settled in the states of the Commonwealth, without
exception, are to shave their beards, cease to wear Jewish robes, and wear those
that are used by Christians in the states of the Commonwealth, the supervision of
which we entrust to the viovodeship [regional] commissions, in the normal term
for law, one year from promulgation."' 10 4  He also proposed compulsory
assimilation of Jews. These proposals were not only inconsistent with Kollqtaj's
professed respect for "the rights of the Jews as a religious minority"' 1 5 but
violated Jewish liberties granted by Polish kings and Diets since the thirteenth
century.
In the final analysis, the legacy of the 1791 Constitution is far more complex
than most scholars care (or dare, given the almost mythical status of the
Constitution in the popular imagination) to admit. Over the centuries, the 1791
Constitution has become a document of great importance for Poland, not so much
for the values it incorporated as for what it came to symbolize: Poland's national
identity on the brink of partition. For Poles it represents a legacy of
independence, sovereignty, democracy, and what Brzezinski calls a "mature
political culture," which they were unable to recover for 200 years (before
1989).106 But that same Constitution abandoned some of Poland's most noble
principles, including those embodied in the 1573 Warsaw Confederation. Most
importantly, the 1791 Constitution accorded constitutional status to anti-semitism
(by incorporating the Cities Act).
It is also worth noting, in light of debates over the legitimacy of Poland's new
Constitution, that the 1791 Constitution was adopted through extraordinary,
legally dubious procedures. Norman Davies and Jacek Jedruch have each referred
to it as a "coup d'etat".107 Father Koll4taj's Party intentionally introduced the
draft Constitution to the Sejm on a day when two-thirds of the deputies were
absent on holiday. "Queries about a quorum were quashed."10 8 The Constitution
102 Stone, supra note 41, at 67.
103 Joan S. Skurnowicz, Polish Szlachta Democracy at the Crossroads, 1795-1831, in POLISH
DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 73, 75.
104 Quoted in WALICKI, supra note 94, at 74.
105 Id.
'Q6 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 45.
107 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 534; JACEK JEDRUCH, CONSTITUTIONS, ELECTIONS AND
LEGISLATURES OF POLAND, 1493-1977: A GUIDE TO THEIR HISTORY 212 (1982).
108 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 534.
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was passed, and King Stanislaw-August Poniatowski signed it. There was no
public referendum to ratify the Constitution. The new supreme law of the land
had been approved by less than one-third of the deputies to a legislative body that
itself represented no more than ten percent of the population, plus the King.
The 1791 Constitution remained in effect for only fourteen months before
Russia invaded Poland. After soundly defeating the vastly outnumbered Polish
army, the Russians in January 1793 entered into an agreement with Prussia to
partition Poland. That marked the end of the legal life of the 1791 Constitution
but secured that document's place as the romantic symbol of Polish independence.
But the story of the 1791 Constitution is not complete without some reference
to the 1794 "National Rising" led by Tadeusz Kogciuszko. Indeed, Poland's 1794
"National Rising," more than the 1791 Constitution itself, was the "natural
culmination of the reformist movement" in Poland. 109
On March 24, 1794 Tadeusz Ko~ciuszko, a hero of the American Revolution
(and a Brigadier-General in the U.S. Army), called on the Polish nation to take up
arms and liberate itself from the foreign powers that had partitioned the country.
The result was not simply an insurrection but a revolution. Even before the battle
was joined, the leaders of the Rising had established a Supreme National Council
to direct the creation of a new, independent government. But Ko~ciuszko
understood that the success of the revolt depended on the full participation of all
estates, including the peasantry, which had little reason to fight under the 1791
Constitution. Thus, on May 7, 1794, Ko~ciuszko issued the Manifesto of
Polaniec,1 10 which "free[d] the peasantry as a whole from servitude, halv[ed]
their dues, and promis[ed] the help of insurrectionary authorities against the wrath
of landowners." '  The Manifesto, in effect, amended the 1791 Constitution, and
it brought out the peasantry en masse. Fighting with scythes, they helped
Ko~ciuszko's army rout General Tomasov's Russian forces at Raclawice.
Warsaw and Wilno were liberated. Poland briefly reemerged as an independent
and somewhat more democratic country. 112
However, Poland's restored independence was short-lived. The Russians and
Prussians combined to suppress the uprising. They amassed a vast army against
Ko~ciuszko's irregulars. By October 1794 the greatly outnumbered Polish forces
were virtually surrounded at Maciejowice, near Warsaw. Ko~ciuszko was
wounded and taken prisoner by the Russians. The revolution had failed. It was
"the end of Poland." 1 13 Indeed, the Treaty of Partition signed by Russia, Prussia,
and Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg in 1797 provided (in part) that "the
name ... Kingdom of Poland ... shall remain suppressed as from the present and
forever." 1 14
109 Id. at 538.
1o0 Reprinted in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 37, at 189 (Ewa Hauser trans.).
H] DAVIES, supra note 23, at 539.
112 It should also be noted that Jews fought alongside the peasantry in the "National Rising."
See Stone, supra note 41, at 71; WALICKI, supra note 94, at 112.
113 DAVIES, supra note 23, at 541.
"4 Quoted in id. at 542.
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The Constitution of Poland's Second Republic (1918-39)
From the fall of 1794 to the end of World War I in 1918, Poles were subjects
of foreign tsars, kings, and emperors. In November 1918, following the collapse
of the partitioning powers, Poland reasserted its sovereignty and re-constituted
itself as an independent state.
Re-constituting the Polish state after a century-and-a-quarter of partition
proved to be no mean feat. Regions of the newly reunited country were governed
by disparate social, cultural, economic, political, and legal norms of three foreign
sovereigns: Russia, Prussia (Germany), and Austria-Hungary. Brzezinski
illustrates the problem of reunification by pointing out that six different currencies
were in use throughout Poland's Second Republic until 1920.1 15 However,
currency conversion was hardly Poland's greatest concern. "Unifying the legal
system proved even more difficult. The existence of three primary legal systems,
combined with recalcitrant provincial jurisdictions, frustrated the achievement of
a unified national system."' 116 Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that the
process of adopting a new constitution, which began in 1919, took only two years
to complete.
The resulting 1921 Constitution is interesting because it appears to continue
many of the traditions of Poland's earlier written and unwritten constitutions. The
preamble to the 1921 Constitution proclaimed that the government of the Second
Republic would "adhere to the glorious tradition of the immortal Constitution of
May 3d [1791]."'117 But the primary model for the 1921 Constitution was not
Poland's 1791 Constitution but the French Constitutional Laws of 1875, which to
members of Poland's Constitutional Commission embodied "the essence of
democracy, popular will represented in a directly elected Parliament which stands
at the head of the state." 118 The idea of combining a strong, directly-elected
Parliament with a (relatively) weak executive certainly was not novel in Polish
constitutional thought or practice. What was new was the broader democratic
focus: the 1921 Constitution was the first in Poland's history to reject monarchy
altogether and establish participatory democracy based on proportional
representation regardless of social class.
Poland's Constitutional Commission intentionally followed historical
precedent in creating a weak executive (labeled "President" rather than King)
specifically to avert the prospect of despotism. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, concerns about despotism masked the ruling nobility's more practical
concern to maintain its own liberties. But in 1921 the concern with despotism
115 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 48.
116 Id. Other analysts have noted four or even five separate legal systems operating in
partitioned Poland; in addition to Russian, Prussian (German), and Austrian law, some regions were
subject to laws introduced during the Napoleonic wars, and some areas in the South were subject to
Hungarian law. See Bronislaw Helczyfiski, The Law in the Reborn State, in POLISH LAW, supra note
35, at 139.
117 POL. CONST. Preamble (1921).
118 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 48-49.
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was more immediate. Poland's largest political party, the National Democratic
Party, led by ardent nationalist and unabashed anti-Semite Roman Dmowski,
feared that a strong presidency would "allow a single dynamic leader" in the
person of Marshal J6zef Pilsudski, charismatic hero of Poland's 1920 war against
Russia, 119 head of Poland's provisional government, and self-styled (non-
Marxist) socialist, "to dominate the government."1 20
In the opinion of some analysts, concerns about Pilsudski led the framers of
the 1921 Constitution to create an unbalanced power structure that placed too
much authority in the hands of a fragmented Parliament and too little in the hands
of the executive. Brzezinski has written that the 1921 Constitution created "an
impotent 'sejmocracy,"' with the Sejm possessing "virtual supremacy in the
public policy-making process." 12 1 Indeed, the Sejm had exclusive responsibility
under the Constitution for the national budget, constitutional amendments, the
army, and taxation; "a simple majority vote of the Sejm could force a single
minister, the entire cabinet, or even the President, to resign." 12 2 The President, by
contrast, could not dissolve the Sejm; he did not even possess the authority to veto
legislation. In time of war, the President could not serve as Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces but could only appoint one upon the recommendation of the
Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister's Cabinet), which was directly
answerable to the Sejm, not to the President.123 In sum, the President's role was
purely formal. For that reason, Marshal Pilsudski refused to accept the post,
which he derided as a "gilded cage." 124
119 In 1919, following Germany's withdrawal from the Ober-Ost region, the Polish Army, led
by Marshal Pilsudski, reclaimed Wilno (today, Vilnius, Lithuania, which was Pilsudski's birthplace)
and Minsk. This irked the Russian Bolsheviks, who were still enmeshed in domestic military struggles
to consolidate their rule throughout greater Russia. They were not too busy with those domestic
struggles, however, to rebuke Poland's eastward advances. Moreover, the Soviets had designs of their
own to expand communist rule to the West. By January 1920, the Red Army had amassed more than
700 thousand troops along a line that stretched from Latvia south to Romania. Pilsudski's Polish
Army, in a series of "sharp" attacks and "daring" marches delayed for several months a Soviet
advance. However, by the beginning of August 1920 the Red Army had advanced as far west as the
suburbs of Warsaw. Denied military assistance by Britain and France, the Poles were on their own.
However, "[alt the very moment when the enemy was pausing to deliver the final blow, the Polish
Army re-formed in a manoeuvre of daring complexity." Pilsudski's Army managed to encircle the
Russian forces and routed the Red Army. "A hundred thousand Russians were taken prisoner. Forty
thousand fled into East Prussia. Three Soviet Armies were annihilated. The rest struggled eastwards
in total disarray. This was the 'Miracle on the Vistula'." By the time the war ended with the signing
of the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921, the Polish Army had pushed the Bolsheviks half way back to
Moscow. The eastern borders of Poland's Second Republic were secured (at least for the time being).
2 NORMAN DAVIES, GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 396-403 (1982).
120 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 50.
121 Id. at 48.
122 Id. at 49.
123 Id. at 50.
124 Quoted in id.
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It has been argued that the power structure of the 1921 Constitution
destabilized Poland politically at the very moment the country most required
stabilization. Thus, Brzezinski concludes that the 1921 Constitution "provided a
political structure that sowed the seeds of ineffective government, reminiscent of
pre-1791 Poland." 125 But it is not at all clear that the Constitution itself was a
significant cause of Poland's travails during the inter-war period. The 1921
Constitution certainly cannot be said to have caused the economic crisis that
discredited successive Polish governments and ultimately led to Pilsudski's coup
d'&tat in 1926. Poland might well have been better off with a stronger executive.
A strong President might have been able to ameliorate Poland's economic
difficulties at least marginally. Indeed, it is entirely possible that outright
dictatorship would have provided Poland with greater stability than Poland's
democratic constitution. But that would hardly provide cause to criticize the 1921
Constitution.
What must be remembered is that Poland was attempting to rebuild (more
accurately, to build for the first time) a modem state and economy after a century-
and-a-quarter of foreign rule, in post-war circumstances of massive geographic
and ethnic dislocation and differentiation, high inflation, internal ethnic strife, as
well as military hostility from Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. That Poland
managed to reconstitute itself at all is remarkable enough. And, when viewed in
its historical context, Poland's 1921 Constitution was a remarkable document. It
was an entirely modem and democratic constitution, which subordinated:
the executive government to a bicameral Sejm elected by universal suffrage,
guaranteed the legal equality and protection by the State of all citizens irrespective
of 'origin, nationality, language, race or religion'; the abolition of hereditary and
class privileges and titles; the rights of property, whether private or collective; the
regulation of land-owning with a view to creating 'private farming units capable
of adequate productivity'; the rights of free expression, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience, and religious practice; the right to
unemployment and sickness benefit, to protection against the abuses of child,
female, and injurious employment, to education at the expense of the state; and
the retention by Minorities of their specific nationality, language, and
character. 126
Unfortunately, this liberal-democratic constitution, with its promise of a
welfare state, was implemented in a political climate of nationalism and
radicalism of all stripes. Beyond the passage of the Constitution itself, disparate
political parties could not agree on the nature or direction of state policies.
Economic conditions, meanwhile, were horrific. Already high rates of
unemployment and inflation were growing ever higher; investment capital was in
short supply; and Poland's economy was under-industrialized to say the least.
Davies does not exaggerate when he suggests that "[i]n the first years of the
Republic's existence, the entire economic system had to be constructed from
Vol. 1998
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scratch." 127  In such circumstances, no constitution, however perfect, could
ensure stability. Indeed, the first governments of Poland's post-partition era may
well have faced greater challenges than those that confronted the first post-
communist government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989.
The political and economic problems that hampered successive governments
in post-partition Poland, along with the perceived lack of necessary institutional
reforms, led Marshal Pilsudski to stage a coup d'ctat in 1926 "against the system
he himself had initiated." 128 Denying any intention to set himself up as a dictator,
Pilsudski did not assume office in the new government he established-he created
a political party, the Bezpartyjny Blok Wsp6lpracy z Rzqdem (BBWR), 129 to do
that. Pilsudski preferred to operate behind the scenes, but there was no question
who was in control.
The 1921 Constitution was amended after Pilsudski's coup to broaden the
powers of the executive in order to provide for more effective and efficient
government. Specifically, the 1926 amendments authorized the President to issue
decrees when the Sejm was not in session and gave the President, for the first
time, the power to dissolve Parliament. This did not mean the end of
parliamentary government in Poland, however. The Sejm still had to approve all
presidential decrees issued between sessions.130 Brzezinski has suggested that,
despite its undemocratic origins, the 1926 amendments improved the 1921
Constitution by better balancing the respective powers of the legislative and
executive branches, which provided greater stability to the structure of
government. 13 1 This may have been true as a formal, legal matter. But, in"
reality, the amendments did not stabilize anything.
After Pilsudski's 1926 coup and the 1926 Constitutional amendments, his,
regime, known as the Sanacja, held power until the Nazi's invaded Poland in
1939. But its rule was hardly stable. Its short-lived governments came and went
just like those before the coup. The 1926 Constitutional amendments certainly
did not stabilize Poland's economy, which continued to struggle, particularly after
1928-29, when the agricultural sector "fell into a decline from which it never fully
recovered." 132 Obviously, matters were not helped by the general economic
decline that gripped all of Europe in the wake of America's Great Depression.
By 1928 Pilsudski and his party had already grown disatisfied with the
balance of power under the 1926 amendments to the 1921 Constitution; they
called for a complete constitutional re-writing to provide even greater executive
authority, so that the President could "act effectively and decisively" to solve the
127 Id. at 415.
128 Id. at 421.
129 In the early 1990s, Polish President Lech Wal~sa created a political party modelled after the
pre-war BBWR. Like Pilsudski before him, Walgsa was motivated by a perceived lack of executive
authority under the 1989 amendments to Poland's 1952 Constitution; in his view, that lack of
executive authority obstructed efficient government.
130 See BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 53.
131 Id.
132 DAVIES, supra note 119, at 411.
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nation's economic problems. 133 His party submitted a new constitutional draft
for parliamentary consideration in 1931. The final version, signed into law on
April 23, 1935, was designed for a strong ruler. It declared that "the one and
undivided power of the state was concentrated in the person of the President of
the Republic and that the government, the sejm, the senate, the armed forces, the
tribunals, and the state audit were subordinate to him." The President,
meanwhile, was answerable only to "God and history." 134 The 1935 Constitution
thus marked "a decisive break with liberal parliamentarianism." 135
The 1935 Constitution was tailor-made for Marshal Pilsudski, but ironically
he died just three weeks after its enactment. Pilsudski was entombed in Krak6w's
Wawel Cathderal, the final resting place of Polish kings. After his death Poland
was left essentially leaderless. In the new constitutional system, the Sejm was
institutionally too weak to run the country; the President held the lion's share of
power. But Pilsudski had been the only man in Poland popular and charismatic
enough to wield that power effectively. In his place sat a group of colonels who
ruled Poland by martial committee. Their petty infighting led to inconsistent
policies that left the Polish state and economy adrift-easy pickings for yet
another partition by Germany and the Soviet Union, this time under the secret
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. As Davies concluded, Poland's Second
Republic was "destined for destruction."1 36
When Hitler's Germany attacked Poland in September 1939, starting World
War II, the Polish government went into exile, first to Paris, and then after Paris
fell to the Germans, to London. This effectively terminated the 1935
Constitution. Any hope the government-in-exile had of returning to Poland after
the war and re-establishing the pre-existing system proved to be wishful thinking.
The Soviets, who joined Hitler by invading Poland on September 17, had other
plans for post-war Poland-plans that were in essence ratified by the allied
powers at the conference held in February 1945 at Yalta.
The Constitution of the Polish People's Republic (1944-1989)
Poland was re-constituted, yet again, following World War II. But this time
it was not allowed to re-constitute itself; an outside power, the Soviet Union,
dictated its political, economic, and constitutional system. Consequently,
Poland's 1952 Constitution (the "Communist Constitution") cannot really be
cbnsidered part of Poland's endogenous constitutional history. And yet, it is
undeniably part of Poland's constitutional heritage. At some level a constitution
is a constitution regardless of its pedigree or political legitimacy or, for that
matter, its lack of real legal authority. 137
133 BRZEZtNSKI, supra note 32, at 53.
134 POL. CONST. (1935), arts. 2 and 3.
135 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 55-56.
136 DAVIES, supra note 119, at 434.
137 On this argument, I might be criticized for not discussing the Constitution of the Kingdom
of Poland that Tsar Alexander of Russia imposed on partitioned Poland in 1815. Still, I sense that the
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Poland's 1952 Constitution was "patterned on the Soviet Constitution of
1936, retaining much of the original language [from] that document and reflecting
major inputs by Soviet constitutional theorists." 13 8  It was, indeed, "a Polish
language equivalent of the Soviet Constitution." 139 Despite its liberal-democratic
pretenses-provisions ostensibly guaranteeing universal suffrage and freedom of
speech, religion, and assembly-Poland's 1952 Constitution created a power
structure, through institutions such as "socialist democracy" and "socialist
legality," that vested all political power in the Communist Party. 
140
Actually, the 1952 Constitution did not so much create as reflect the reality
of communist hegemony. To claim that the 1952 Constitution vested power in
Poland's Communist Party would be to invert cause and effect. It was not the
Constitution that gave power to the Party but the Party that gave power to the
Constitution. The Party already had power, which it used to impose the
Constitution on a disaffected population. Moreover, to the extent that the
Constitution was intended merely to create an illusion of democracy in Poland, it
was a big failure. From its inception, no one inside or outside Poland seriously
believed that the Party/state would deliver on its promises of democratic and
liberal institutions because those promises were expressly contradicted by other
constitutional provisions, such as Article 70, which "made it a criminal act to
'abuse freedom of conscience and religion for purposes of undermining the
interests of the Polish People's Republic." ' 14 1  But since liberal-democratic
institutions were promised, the people kept demanding them until the very end of
the communist era.
Not only was the Constitution intended to create the mere illusion of
democracy, it was itself a legal illusion. The 1952 Constitution was not a
constitution in the liberal-democratic sense of "the highest law of the land." In
fact, it was hardly a legal document at all. The various powers it created and the
rights and liberties it purportedly guaranteed were not self-executing but had to be
Communist Constitution, perhaps only because of longevity, is more a part of Poland's Constitutional
heritage than the 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland, which was in effect for only 15 years.
On the 1815 Constitution, see, e.g., Ludwik Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, Polish Constitutional Law, in
POLISH LAW, supra note 35, at 215, 252-53.
138 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 63.
139 ld.
140 Article 7 of Poland's 1952 Constitution, as amended in 1976, provided that "[tlhe Polish
People's Republic realizes and develops a socialist democracy." DZIENNIK USTAW [Journal of Laws],
Item No. 36 (No. 7, 1976). This concept of "socialist democracy" has been described as "[tihe
paramount feature of the Constitution," the sum total of all its goals. MICHAL SADOWSKI, THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PEOPLE'S POLAND 81 (1976). It became a euphemism for anything the Party
leadership chose to do because, as the bearers of ideological truth, any policies they instituted
furthered "socialist democracy." At the same time, any political activities that deviated from Party
policy, by definition, violated the principle of "socialist democracy." See DANIEL H. COLE,
INSTITUTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: FROM RED TO GREEN IN POLAND 90 (1998).
141 See BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 71.
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implemented by "ordinary statutes and other normative acts." 142 Meanwhile, the
Constitution did not require the enactment of implementing legislation.
Therefore, it was entirely without legal force, except to the extent the Party/state
chose to enforce it. That, of course, was a matter of policy rather than law.
Consequently, in People's Poland there was no constitutional law, only
constitutional policy. That policy was determined, and subject to change at any
time, exclusively by the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in consultation
with its "fraternal ally" in Moscow.
The Constitution was amended in 1976, in part to better reflect this reality.
The amendments "formally recognized the Party's political monopoly" by
institutionalizing its "leading role" in the building of socialism. 143 And they
"enshrined Poland's fraternal ties with the Soviet Union." 144 In the eyes of many
Poles, this implicit subordination of national sovereignty to a historical foe
constituted an act of treason by the PZPR. Thus, the 1976 amendments
accomplished what was seemingly impossible: they further discredited Poland's
Communist Constitution. They also catalyzed opposition to the communist
regime.145 Within a year after the 1976 amendments were enacted (without any
effort at popular ratification), the Party was "confronted by a united and
nationally-based organization making fundamental political and economic
demands." 146  Within three years, this organization evolved into the national
movement known as Solidarity, which ultimately toppled the PZPR from power.
Ironically, the 1976 amendments may have hastened the downfall of the system
they were designed to shore-up.
The 1952 Constitution was amended again in 1982. These amendments
introduced two new institutions: a Constitutional Tribunal to adjudicate the
conformity of statutes and regulations to constitutional standards; and a Tribunal
of State, "a quasi-judicial 'impeachment' court designed to hold state officials
criminally responsible for official misconduct. 147 The first of these institutions
made little sense in a country where ordinary statutes had greater legal authority
than the Constitution. 14 8 Nevertheless, they both contributed significantly to the
development of constitutional law in Poland. For one thing, they subjected the
executive to greater parliamentary control, which in itself was a significant
achievement. For another, they "introduced [or more appropriately re-introduced]
into Polish political life the notion that governmental authority derives legitimacy
142 Judgment of the Supreme Court of June 4, 1955. ORZECZNICTWO SAU NAJWY2SZEGO 93
(1955), quoted in translation in BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 66. See also, Mark F. Brzezinski, The
Emergence of Judicial Review in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 41 AMER. J. COMP. L. 153,
168 (1993) (suggesting that ordinary statutes had greater legal status than constitutional provisions in
Poland).
143 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 73.
14 Id.
145 See id. at 73-74.
146 Id. at 74.
147 Id. at 77-78.
148 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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from its adherence to the rule of law." 149  Most importantly, they tacitly
repudiated a fundamental tenet of communism: that a communist state would be
devoid of social and political discord. 150 And, after the fall of communism, they
evolved into truly powerful forces for instituting the rule of law and inculcating
respect for the law.
Communism disintegrated in Poland in stages, the first of which occurred on
January 1, 1989, when a new Law on Economic Activity took effect. 151 That
statute, in effect, ended the socialist experiment in Poland by freeing most sectors
of the Polish economy from central planning and centralized resource
allocation. 152 A few months later, in April 1989, the Communist government
negotiated the "Round Table" Agreements with the (still outlawed) Solidarity
trade union. Those Agreements called for (semi-)free elections, held in June
1989, which led directly to the demise of Communist Party rule. Election rules
(under the "Round Table" Agreements) reserved sixty-five percent of seats in the
Sejm for Party-backed candidates. However, Solidarity-backed candidates
managed to win every seat available to them. Even more humiliating for the
Party, most of its own unopposed candidates failed to win election; they were
defeated by Polish voters who simply crossed their names off the ballot. As a
referendum on Communist Party rule, the resuit of the June 1989 election was
beyond dispute; it exposed for the whole world the illegitimacy of Communist
Party rule in Poland. 153 . Indeed, the election results made it impossible for a new
Communist-dominated government to gain parliamentary approval. Eventually,
in September 1989, then-President Jaruzelski (the same man who outlawed
Solidarity and declared martial law in 1981) asked Solidarity-activist Tadeusz
Mazowiecki to form Poland's first non-communist government in more than fifty
years. A few months later, Poland's Communist Party quietly dissolved itself..
Precursors to the 1997 Constitution in Post-Communist Poland
After the fall of communism in 1989, everyone agreed that Poland required a
new constitution. However, there was little consensus about the structure of
government or the nature of rights (e.g., positive versus negative) under a new
constitution. There was also widespread disagreement about the process for
adoption and ratification. It took post-communist Poland eight years, three
different Parliaments, and (depending on how one counts) six different
governments to resolve these difficulties. At its smallest the Sejn included six
149 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 77.
150 This was also reflected in other institutional developments of the 1980s, including the
creation in 1980 of a High Administrative Court to adjudicate disputes between citizens and
administrative agencies. On this institution, see id. at 139-40.
151 DZIENNIK USTAW [Journal of Laws], Item No. 324 (No. 41, 1988).
152 Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, the changes wrought by the 1988 Law on Economic Activity
may have been more radical than those resulting from the "Balcerowicz Plan" of shock-therapy
reforms instituted at the beginning of 1990. See COLE, supra note 140, at 183-84.
' See id. at 185.
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different political parties, ranging from the post-communist Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej and social-democratic Unia Pracy to the pro-reform, pro-
business Unia Wolnogci and the ultra-nationalist Konfederacja Polski
Niepodleglej; at its largest the Parliament contained thirty-eight parties,
representing an even broader spectrum of (often radical) interests. That such
disparate parties could ever come to agree on a constitution is remarkable in itself.
To some extent, their task was made easier by the exigencies of circumstances
following the fall of communism. Poland's 1952 Constitution required major
surgery just to facilitate the legal development of markets and democratic
institutions. Three sets of major amendments were enacted after 1989 before the
1952 Constitution was finally completely replaced in 1997.
The constitutional amendments of April and December 1989 and the "Small
Constitution" of 1992 effectively converted Poland from a communist-totalitarian
system to a constitutional Rechtstaat. The April 1989 amendments, enacted to
implement the "Round Table" Agreements, altered the system of elections to
introduce political pluralism, and "marked the end of the authoritarian phase of
Polish political life." 154 But these amendments were not intended to eliminate
communist rule entirely; to the contrary, they were intended to shore-up the
PZPR's control by ensuring that the Party would maintain an electoral majority in
the Sejm.
In addition, the April 1989 amendments greatly'strengthened the role of the
President in the Polish constitutional system. By increasing the authority of then-
President Jaruzelski, the amendments counterbalanced the reduction, in 'Party
control of the Sejm. Apparently, the Communists considered this trade-off (less
power in the Sejm but more power for their President) would help them maintain
control. But this proved to be wishful thinking. Once the Party.agreed to political
pluralism and (semi-)free elections, their days in power were numbered.
The April 1989 amendments also freed the judicial branch from political (i.e.,
Party) control. They did not just promise judicial independence - that had been
done in the 1952 Constitution - but ensured it by giving Supreme Court justices
life tenure and "precluding direct contacts between political officials and
members of the judiciary." 155 The state's courts were made independent from
prosecution bodies.
In sum, the April 1989 amendments "contributed to the restoration of basic
elements of the doctrine of separation of powers" and a system of checks and
balances; they "signified the demise of the Soviet-style governmental system of
entirely centralized state authority."' 156 But a great deal of reformation remained
to be done. The amended 1952 Constitution still retained remnants of Stalinism,
and did not yet provide a framework within which democratic and liberal
institutions could take root.
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The next significant step toward that end occurred in December 1989. By
then, the Communist Party had been swept aside in (semi-)free elections, and
Solidarity had gained a working majority in Parliament (even though sixty-five
percent of the seats in the lower house, the Sejm, were held by PZPR-backed
candidates). The first Solidarity government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki was in
power, and though General Jaruzelski was still President, he was, for all practical
purposes, a president without a party. As a consequence of the sudden collapse of
communism, which occurred much faster than anyone had dared to imagine, the
April 1989 amendments to the 1952 Constitution were already obsolete. A brand
new constitution was needed to reflect the new political realities in Poland. In
recognition of the fact that this would take some time, the Sejm enacted another
round of interim amendments to the 1952 Constitution.
The December 1989 amendments obliterated virtually all remnants of
communism from the Constitution. They
deleted the Constitution's preamble and first two chapters on the political and
socioeconomic system of the Polish People's Republic. They also eliminated the
anachronistic clause declaring the Party's 'leading role', expunged reference to
Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, deleted the clause describing Poland's
economy as based on 'socialized means of production' and introduced the
principle of the equality of diverse forms of ownership, thus providing a
constitutional foundation for private property and the emerging market
economy. 157
The December 1989 amendments also changed the country's name from the
Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland. Most importantly, Article 1
evoked the Rechtstaat clause of (West) German constitutional law in proclaiming
Poland "a democratic state ruled by law, implementing principles of social
justice."158
By the end of 1989, Poland was no longer constituted as a communist
country. Its constitutional framework was already far closer to those of the
liberal-democratic countries of the West than to that of the Soviet Union.
Poland's transition to market-democracy was underway. Still, no one assumed
that the task of constitutional revision was anywhere near complete. The
December 1989 amendments were stop-gap measures intended to buy time for a
thorough constitutional re-write. Hardly anyone expected, however, that a wholly
new constitution would take another seven years to complete.
In the interim, successive Polish parliaments further amended the 1952
Constitution. In September 1990, in the wake of the demise of the Communist
Party, the office of the president was strengthened again and made subject, for the
first time, to direct, popular election. This gave the President independent
legitimacy and autonomy from the Sejm. However, the President's powers and
prerogatives remained ambiguous. After the election of Lech WaI~sa as President
in 1990, those ambiguities led to constant disputes between the President, who
157 Id. at 88.
158 This provision was later engrafted into Article 2 of Poland's 1997 Constitution. See infra
note 176 and accompanying text.
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interpreted his powers broadly, and the Sejm, which interpreted the President's
powers more conservatively (i.e., to maintain its own supremacy). Meanwhile,
two more governments-led, respectively, by Prime Ministers Jan Krzysztof
Bielecki and Jan Oiszewski-came and went.
The Olszewski government, in particular, precipitated something of a
constitutional crisis in Poland, as it continually challenged the President's
prerogatives, particularly -in the realm of national defense. According to
contemporary public opinion polls, sixty-five percent of respondents deplored the
resulting "political chaos."'1 59 Further constitutional amendments were needed to
delineate more clearly the balance of powers between president, government, and
parliament. In February 1992 the Sejm established a Constitutional Commission
to draft a replacement for the 1952 Constitution (as amended). But before it could
even begin drafting a replacement, the Commission had to deal with the
immediate political/constitutional crisis, which it did by drafting the "Small
Constitution" of 1992.
The Small Constitution was intended to resolve the existing "political
paralysis" caused by disputes between President Walqsa and Prime Minister
Olszewski by providing "a formula for productive cooperation and equilibrium
among the three top state authorities." 160 It eliminated the Sejm's constitutional
status as the "highest institution of state authority," and balanced power more
equitably between the office of the president, the government, and the Parliament.
As Brzezinski has written, the Small Constitution established "a compromise
between presidential and parliamentary systems of government."1 6 1
What made the Small Constitution a provisional measure rather than a
complete replacement for the 1952 Constitution was its exclusive focus on the
state's power structure. No attention was paid to other important aspects of the
constitutional system, such as civil and religious liberties. Provisions of the 1952
Constitution (as amended) respecting civil and religious rights were left intact.
President Walqsa attempted to resolve this problem and, for all practical purposes,
complete the task of constitutional reform in November 1992, when he introduced
in Parliament a "Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 16 2 which would have become
part of the "Small Constitution" (in much the same way that the Bill of Rights
became part of the earlier enacted U.S. Constitution). Waltsa's proposal took
everyone by surprise, especially those who suspected him of harboring dictatorial
ambitions. 16 3 The Charter seemed to contradict his political image - the populist
159 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 96 (quoting Polacy niezadowoleni z rozwoju demokracji,
Rzeczpospolita, Dec. 19, 1991, p.1).
160 Id. at 98.
.161 Id.
162 An English translation of the Charter can be found in 1996 SAINT LoUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIc L.J. 73. See generally Stanislaw Frankowski, Lech Wa!psa's Draft of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: An Overview, id. at 65.
163 Walpsa himself fueled such suspicions. He often pointed out that Marshal Pilsudski was his
personal hero; he "recreated" Pilsudski's party, the BBWR, in an effort to consolidate his political
base; and on several occasions he avered that he would intervene personally to protect Poland should
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conservative who fancied himself as another Pilsudski had suddenly become
Poland's "leading representative of social liberalism." 164
Wal sa's proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms was based on the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It contained
22 "basic civil and religious rights common to all liberal democracies," including
the freedom of religion, the right to privacy, and freedom from government
censorship. 165 It also included (in chapter 5) a "catalogue of wishes, in particular
those with which every social liberal identifies, but rather unfeasible and difficult
to materialise." 166  These "economic, social and cultural targets" were not
actually legal rights because citizens could not enforce them. But the government
was responsible for attaining them "according to economic abilities."' 167
Parliament warmly welcomed President Wal~sa's proposed Charter, but had
no chance to enact it because the President dissolved the Sejm and called for new
elections. After those elections Walqsa resubmitted the Charter as part of a larger
draft constitution. It was referred to the new Constitutional Commission, where it
lingered, vying for attention with six other draft constitutions, for the next three
years. In the meantime, the need to enact a new constitution grew less pressing
because of "the hybrid framework created by the April and December
amendments and by the Small Constitution," which "provided the groundwork for
a modem Polish polity as well as institutional stability during a period of
extraordinary politics." 168
In the years that followed the enactment of the 1992 Small Constitution, a
variety of contentious issues plagued the Sejm 's constitution-making efforts.
There were questions of process: Who should draft a new constitution and how?
On what basis and according to what procedures would the Parliament consider
constitutional proposals? Would a new constitution be subject to popular
ratification or, like all previously enacted constitutions in Poland's history, would
it be enacted simply by vote of the people's representatives in Parliament?
Related to these questions of process were questions about legitimacy: Was the
Constitutional Commission a legitimate body to draft a constitution even though it
did not include representatives of all different political viewpoints in the
the ex-communists attempt to retake power, even by democratic means. On the relationship between
Walgsa and Pilsudski, see, e.g., Neal Acherson, The Great Electrician is Playing a Game with
Poland's Faith in Democracy, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File; Roger Boyes, Walesa Draws Strength from Dictator Idol, THE TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; and Adam Michnik, The Worship of
Walesa, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
164 Dawid Warszawski, Belvedere Charter, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Dec. 8, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
165 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 107; Frankowski, supra note 162, 65 etseq.
166 Warszawski, supra note 164.
167 Id.
168 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 129.
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country? 169 And supposing a new constitution would be subject to popular
ratification, how would a referendum be structured? Specifically, how would
popular approval be determined? By a simple majority of votes cast? By a
majority of votes cast but with an additional requirement that a majority of
eligible voters cast ballots? Above all, there were substantive questions about
how state power should be divided between president, government, and
parliament; about the nature of civil and social rights (e.g., positive versus
negative); and about the role of the Catholic Church in a liberal-democratic state.
Not surprisingly, it took the Constitutional Commission a few years to
resolve these various issues. Needless to say, its determinations did not please
everyone. However, it did finally approve a completely new constitution for
consideration by the full Parliament on January 16, 1997, by a vote of forty-five
to two, with one abstention. 170 The National Assembly (comprised of the Sejm
and Senate sitting together) enacted it on April 2, 1997 by a vote of 451 to forty,
with six abstentions. 17 1 The new Constitution was subsequently approved in a
public referendum by 52.7 percent of those voting on May 25, 1997.172 President
169 This question particularly plagued the Sejms elected in 1989 and 1993. The "Round Table"
Sejm elected in 1989 arguably lacked legitimacy because it was not elected freely; the electoral rules
of the "Round Table" Agreements reserved sixty-five percent of the seats in the lower house of the
National Assembly for Communist Party candidates. The next round of parliamentary elections in
1991 solved that problem, but resulted in twenty-eight parties with seats in the Sejm. Consequently,
that Parliament was fractured by political and ideological conflicts. Those conflicts did not, however,
prevent the 1991 Sejm from enacting important legislation, including the Small Constitution of 1992,
which altered the electoral rules once again in an effort to prevent future fractured parliaments. Under
the Small Constitution, only parties that received five percent or more of the popular vote (and
coalitions of parties that received eight percent or more of the popular vote) would be admitted to
Parliament. In the first parliamentary elections held under these rules in 1993, only six parties crossed
the five (or eight) percent threshold. The new electoral rules had achieved their purpose, which did
not necessarily mean, however, that the Sejm was any less fragmented or any more productive.
Indeed, in at least one respect, the five (or eight) percent rule made the new Sejm less productive: the
work of its Constitutional Commission was hampered by questions of legitimacy because so many
parties (and the constituencies they represented) were excluded from the deliberations (because of the
five/eight percent threshold).
170 Constitution Bill Clears Committee, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Jan. 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File. However, the Committee spent another two months to agree on a
preamble to the draft constitution. On March 14, 1997, the Committee voted thirty-two to five, with
two abstentions, to approve a compromise preamble authored by former Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazowiecki. Compromise Preamble to Draft Constitution, PAP NEWS WIRE, Mar. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. For more on that preamble and the controversy
surrounding it, see infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
171 Constitution Adopted, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Apr. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.
172 Voters Approve New Constitution, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Vol. 1998
SAINT LOUIS- WARSAW TRANS-ATLANTIC LAW JOURNAL
Aleksander Kwa.niewski signed it into law on July 16, 1997,173 and it took effect
on October 17, 1997.174
POLAND'S 1997 CONSTITUTION
The 1997 Constitution is, in most respects, a fairly typical example of a
modem democratic European constitution. 175 Like the Small Constitution of
1992, it declares the Republic of Poland to be "a democratic state governed by
law and implementing the principles of social justice." 176 Article 7 provides that
all state bodies must "operate on the basis of and within the limits of the law."
The new Constitution bases Poland's political system on "the division and
balance of power" among four branches of government: the legislative branch,
comprised of the Sejm and Senate, 177 the executive branch under the Prime
Minister, 178 the office of the President, who is primarily responsible for foreign
affairs, 179 and a truly independent judiciary. 180 The 1997 Constitution provides a
framework for a liberal democratic society by guaranteeing traditional personal
and political rights and freedoms in Articles 30-63.181 It establishes the basis for
a free market economy by guaranteeing "the freedom of economic activity."
182
In addition, Poland's new Constitution "cateris] to popular sentiment" by
providing "several economic and positive rights," 183 including the right to safe
and hygienic working conditions, 184 the right "to elementary health care financed
out of public funds," 185 the "right to education," 186 and "the right to be informed
of the quality of the environment and its protection."
' 187
Such social and economic "rights" have become a commonplace in recent
European (and European-style) constitutions. 188  Some (particularly
American 1 89 ) constitutional law experts deplore the combination of positive and
173 New Constitution Signed, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
174 Constitution Takes Effect, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
175 For English language translation of the 1997 Constitution see supra note 13.
176 POL. CONST. art. 2.
177 See id. at ch. IV.
178 See id. at ch. VI.
179 See id. at ch. V.
180 See id. at ch. VII. See also Constitution Takes Effect, supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
181 POL. CONST. ch. II.
182 Id. at art. 22.
183 BRZEZINSKI, supra note 32, at 125. See POL. CONST. arts. 64-76.
184 POL. CONST. art. 66(1).
185 Id. at art. 68(2).
186 Id. at art. 70(1).
187 Id. at art. 74(3).
188 Compare, for example, South Africa's new constitution, in XVII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (G.H. Flanz ed., 1997) (binder).
189 But, not exclusively American. Consider, for example, Professor Ewa Ltowska's recent
characterization of the problems that can arise from guaranteeing positive rights: A hungry traveler
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negative rights because positive rights, such as the right to social security
(guaranteed in Article 67(1) of Poland's new Constitution) are notoriously
difficult to ensure; that is, they tend to be unenforceable. And if some
constitutional rights are unenforceable, that may undermine the enforceability of
other (presumably more important) negative rights in the constitution, such as
freedom from "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" (enshrined
in Article 40 of Poland's new Constitution). 190
Poland's 1997 Constitution attempts to resolve this difficulty in a unique and
innovative way, which some critics of the new Constitution have, unfortunately,
overlooked. 19 1 Article 8(2) provides: "The provisions of the Constitution shall
apply directly, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." The drafters of this
provision evidently were conscious of the danger posed by combining positive
and negative rights in a constitutional document, and they, in effect, bifurcated the
Constitution to reduce the danger.
Those rights (predominantly negative) that are capable of self-execution are
self-executing; other rights (predominantly positive) requiring affirmative state
action are explicitly made subject to legislative determination. Thus, "freedom of
the press," under Article 14 of Poland's 1997 Constitution, is self-executing, as is
the right to be free from "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"
under Article 40.192 On the other hand, Article 67(1) provides that "scope and
forms" of the right to social security "shall be specified by statute." Similarly, the
state's actual obligations with respect to the right of education "shall be specified
by statute." 193
So, at least with respect to civil rights and liberties, Poland has not one but
two new constitutions: one is a traditional bill of rights (American-style),
including self-executing and directly applicable rights to be free from some
interference, public or private. The other is a contemporary (European-style)
"wish-list" of non-self-executing and not directly applicable "rights" to certain
walks into a shady restaurant in Moscow. He sits down and inspects the menu. "I'll have the pork
chops," he says. "We don't have any," answers the waiter. "Well then, I'll have the meat balls." "We
don't have those either." "How about liver then?" "Nope," answers the waiter. The annoyed
customer finally asks: "Am I reading the menu or our constitution?"
Lptowska, supra note 14, at 76.
190 See, e.g., Jon Elster, Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the
Open Sea, 71 PUB. ADMIN. 169, 198 (1993); Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and
Economic Rights Don't Belong in the Constitutions of Post-Communist Europe, 2 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 35 (1993). Oddly, Sunstein has written elsewhere that the traditional distinction between
"positive" and "negative" rights is not particularly meaningful. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITuTION 70 (1993).
191 See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, Rights and Freedoms Under the New Polish Constitution:
Reflections of a Liberal, 1997 SAINT Louis-WARsAW TRANSTLANTIC L.J. 91.
192 But, interestingly, many of the traditional "negative" rights are expressed in positive terms
in Poland's 1997 Constitution. Thus, rather than constitutionally restricting state interference with
freedom of the press, Article 14 states that "[tihe Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom of the
press."
193 POL. CONST. art. 70.
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services from the government. One implication of this bifurcation between self-
executing and non-self-executing rights is that Poland learned well one lesson
from its Communist Constitution of 1952: to be worth the paper they are printed
on, the most important constitutional rights must be self-executing and directly
applicable; they cannot depend on legislation to put them into effect.
Some of the drafters' decisions in categorizing rights as self-executing or not
are questionable. For example, Article 51 provides that "jn]o one may be obliged,
except on the basis of statute, to disclose information concerning his person." By
making this right subject to legislated exceptions, Poland's Constitution fails to
ensure protection against compelled self-incrimination. On the other hand,
Article 74(2) provides that "[p]rotection of the environment shall be the duty of
public authorities." This governmental duty is self-executing, and it is not subject
to any legislative determination of the extent of the duty. Presumably, anyone can
sue the government for failing to protect the environment adequately for any
amount of pollution that is left uncontrolled. This may please environmentalists,
but it is patently unrealistic.
To some extent, disagreements over the categorization of constitutional
rights-as directly enforceable or subject to leglislative determination-reflect the
significant gray area that exists between "positive" and "negative" rights. To take
an American example, we might wonder whether the right of "due process"
enshrined in the 5th and 14th Amendments is a "positive" or a "negative" right.
The 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause is written in the negative-"No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 194
But it operates as a positive requirement for government action-some process
must affirmatively be provided. But how much?
However, what is more important than whether Poland's constitutional
drafters got every right right is that they made clear to citizens what to expect
with respect to each civil and social right provided for in the Constitution. By
explicitly, distinguishing rights that are self-executing and directly enforceable
from those that are not, the framers reduced the risk that the legal force of all
constitutional rights might be devalued - as they were under the Communist
Constitution of 1952. This is a significant innovation that attempts to resolve one
of the more important problems of constitution-writing in the era of welfare
states: Other countries should pay close attention as the Polish Constitution is
implemented to observe whether its bifurcated approach to rights works; if it
does, they should consider adopting similar approaches in their constitutional
documents.
THE 1997 CONSTITUTION'S PLACE IN POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY
From an historical perspective, the legitimacy of Poland's new Constitution
can hardly be doubted. Virtually all of its structural features-the institutions and
194 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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organizations it establishes, the way it balances power among the various units of
national government, its provisions regarding civil and religious-have roots in
constitutional documents of Poland's past, both recent and distant. This is true
even for the most controversial aspects of the new Constitution, including its
preamble and the method by which it was enacted and ratified. From top to
bottom, the new Constitution fits comfortably into Poland's history of
constitutionalism.
The Preamble
The preamble has been among the most controversial features of Poland's
new Constitution. It provides, among many other things:
We, the Polish nation - all citizens of the Republic,
Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty,
As well as those not sharin such faith but respecting those universal values as
arising from other sources. 195
Critics have complained that the reference to God in this statement is
ambiguous and, therefore, insufficient. For example, Solidarity senator Alicja
Grze~kowiak "charged that God was introduced to the constitution through the
back door, as it were, and a classical invocatio Dei was still missing, while the
mention of believers and non-believers is a sign of respect for the non-believing
minority but offends the feelings of the Catholic majority." 196  Others have
argued that the reference to non-believers, constitutes a tacit repudiation of the
supremacy of natural over positive law. 197
The intensity of the debate over this clause of the Preamble is somewhat
surprising in view of the fact that initially there was almost no preamble at all. In
January 1996, the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly decided
against including any preamble in the new Constitution. That decision was
"censured" by the Conference of the Polish Episcopate. Eight months later, the
Committee reversed itself and decided to include a preamble after all. 19 8
Tadeusz Mazowiecki authored the reference to believers and non-believers in
the preamble as a compromise between those, including the Church, that
demanded a traditional invocatio Dei, and liberal forces, including ex-
communists, who preferred no reference to God. When Mazowiecki first
proffered his preamble to the Constitutional Committee, Bishop Tadeusz
Pieronek, Secretary General of the Polish Episcopate, reportedly "welcomed the
initiative" and stated that Mazowiecki's "wording of the preamble... (which
195 POL. CONST. preamble.
196 Constitution Preamble Agreed On, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Dec. 12, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
See, e.g., New Constitution: No End in Sight, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Dec. 5, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
198 See Discussion on Constitutional Preamble Resumed, P6LISH NEWS BULLETIN, Sept. 19,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld-File.
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contained a reference to God) satisfied the criteria of a democratic and pluralistic
state." 199 Contemporaneous news reports noted that Poland's 1791 and 1921
Constitutions had included preambles making reference to God. The 1935
Constitution included no preamble at all, though it made the country's president
accountable "before God and history." The Communist Constitution of 1952 did
include an elaborate preamble but, not surprisingly, made no reference to God.
200
One may therefore ask whether the Preamble's reference to God is consistent
or inconsistent with Poland's constitutional heritage. The issue is debatable. It
can at least be argued that it is sufficiently consistent, and not only with the 1952
and 1935 Constitutions (which are probably the two least valued of Poland's
previous constitutions and the two least acceptable as models). It is also
consistent, in a general sense, with the tradition of toleration that existed in
Poland's First Republic through the end of the sixteenth century, as exemplified
in constitutional documents such as the 1573 Warsaw Confederation 20 1 and in the
libertarian expressions of, among others, Jan Zamoyski, 202 King Zygmunt
August, 20 3 and particularly Piotr Myszkowski, who appealed to the Sejm in 1565:
"Let not the different understanding of the [Sacred] Scripture shatter the love
between us." 204 This is not to say that these men would have approved of the
reference to "those not sharing such faith" in God in the 1997 Constitution's
preamble. There is no evidence that atheists would have been tolerated in
sixteenth-century Poland on the same basis as dissidents and Jews. And yet, even
the preamble's humanistic reference has strong roots in Poland's history, for
example in the sixteenth-century writings of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski. 20 5
But is the unwritten constitution of sixteenth-century Poland a valid reference
point for determining the historical legitimacy of the preamble or Poland's new
Constitution generally? The Preamble appears to answer this question directly
and unambiguously:
Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic,
Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valuable from our over one
thousand years' heritage.
There is no question that many of Poland's "best traditions" were established
in the First Republic, and many of them remain "valuable" to this day.
There is yet another aspect of the Preamble to the 1997 Constitution that is
worth noticing because it appears to mark a significant change in Polish
conceptions of nationality and citizenship. Unlike previous constitutional
documents in Polish history, and in contrast to persistent public perceptions, the
199 See id.
200 Id.
201 See Miller, supra note 44, at 21; SOROKA, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
202 See LEDNICKI, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
203 See LEDNICKI, supra note 58, at 47-8.
204 See TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 50, 117, 121.
205 See TAZBIR, supra note 28, at 139; Siemiefiski, supra note 29, at 61; Voisd, supra note 76
and accompanying text.
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Preamble seems to equate citizenship with membership in the Polish nation in
stating, "We, the Polish Nation-all citizens of the Republic .. " Compare this
statement, for example, with the 1921 Constitution, which stated that
"[s]overeignty in the Republic of Poland belongs to the nation," 20 6 and
enumerated the rights of citizens, 20 7 but never indicated whether all citizens
comprise the Polish "nation."- In fact, Article 110 of the 1921 Constitution
referred to "Polish citizens belonging to national... minorities," implying that
citizenship is not equivalent to membership in the Polish nation.
The distinction between citizenship and membership in the Polish nation in
the 1921 Constitution is consistent with modem conceptions of Polish nationalism
(dating from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). But it is not consistent with
all historical conceptions of the Polish nation. For example, Ko~ciuszko's
"concept of the Polish nation ... embraced all the inhabitants of the partitioned
Commonwealth, irrespective of their estate, property, religion, or ethnic
origin."20 8 As Norman Davies has written:
In the old Republic, prior to 1795, Polish nationality could indeed be defined in
terms of loyalty to the state. The "Polish nation' was usually reserved as an
appellation for those inhabitants who enjoyed full civil and political rights, and
thus for the nobility alone. It did not refer to a man's native language, his
religion, or ethnic origin. Hence, in this context, there were many 'Poles', who in
modem terms might not be so described.209
It was only later that "[t]he word 'nation' shed its former political
connotation and increasingly assumed its modem cultural and ethnic
overtones." 2 10 Thus, to the extent the 1997 Constitution equates citizenship with
membership in the Polish nation, it harkens back to a first-republican conception
of "nation," but with a more democratic scope.
But does the 1997 Constitution really equate citizenship with membership in
the Polish nation? Despite the language of the preamble, various provisions of the
1997 Constitution refer to national minorities, 2 11 suggesting that citizenship and
nationality are not the same after all. Consequently, the relation between
citizenship and nationality remains ambiguous under the new Constitution.
Civil and Political Rights
Beyond the Preamble itself, most provisions in the body of the 1997
Constitution are not very controversial, possessing clear ties to Poland's
constitutional history. For instance, Article 41(2), which guarantees the right of
habeas corpus, is a direct descendent of the 1433 Privilege of Jedlna. 2 12 It states:
206 POL. CONST. (1921) art. 2.
207 See id. at arts. 12-14.
208 WALICKI, supra note 94, at 112.
209 DAVIES, supra note 119, at 11.
210 Id. at 12.
211 POL. CONST. arts. 27 and 35.
212 See Wagner, THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 25, at 133; Siemiefiski, supra note 34
and accompanying text.
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"Anyone deprived of liberty, except by sentence of a court, shall have the right to
appeal to a court for immediate decision upon the lawfulness of such
deprivation." Article 53, which ensures freedom of religion without exception, is
more closely analogous to the 1573 Warsaw Confederation than to the 1791
Constitution, which expressly authorized statutory limitations on religious
freedom. 2 13  More controversially, unlike the 1921 Constitution, the 1997
Constitution does not establish the Roman Catholic Church in "the chief position
among enfranchised religions." 2 14 Indeed, the new Constitution's only reference
to the Catholic Church is in Article 25(4), which merely states that "[rielations
between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be
determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute."
Meanwhile, Article 25(3) establishes a clear separation between church and state,
promising that each will retain "autonomy and.., independence.., in its own
sphere." It remains to be seen whether this constitutional separation can be
operationalized in a country that is ninety-five percent Roman Catholic. But,
from an historical point of view, the separation of church and state is consistent
with the spirit and the laws of Poland's First Republic.
Socio-Economic Rights
Some have argued that the list of "socio-economic" rights in the 1997
Constitution is an unfortunate legacy of Poland's Communist [1952] Constitution,
which enunciated many such rights that the Party/state either could not or would
not enforce. As Wojciech Sadurski has written, "in a system where a nihilist
tradition of treating a constitution as a purely decorative instrument is strongly
embedded, and where the fundamental notions of constitutionalism and rule of
law have a weak place in the collective consciousness, everything that undermines
a strict construction of constitutional limits upon discretionary governmental
action is to be regarded with concern." 2 15 Implicit in this argument is a sense that,
the 1952 Constitution was not really a constitution in the sense of being the
supreme law of the land; and even if it was a real constitution, it was not a real
Polish constitution but a Soviet import. Thus, it can provide nothing of value for
constitutional drafters in post-communist Poland.
It would be a mistake, however, to claim that Poland's 1952 Constitution is
the only historical source of the socio-economic rights found in Poland's 1997
Constitution. Poland's 1921 Constitution provided several such socio-economic
rights. For example, Article 102 provided that "[e]very citizen has the right to
state protection for his labor, and in case of lack of work, illness, accident, or
debility, to the benefits of social insurance which will be determined by a special
statute." Furthermore, Article 103 guaranteed "state care and aid" for "[c]hildren
without sufficient parental care." There is, therefore, an historical basis beyond
the 1952 Constitution for constitutionalizing socio-economic rights in Poland.
213 See Miller, supra note 44, at 21; SOROKA, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
214 POL. CONST. (1921) art. 114.
215 Sadurski, supra note 191, at 98.
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Moreover, such rights are commonly found in many constitutions throughout the
world today.
To be fair, Sadurski's argument is not really about the historical legitimacy of
socio-economic rights in the Constitution. His concern is with the dangers that
socio-economic rights pose for the enforceability of (supposedly more important)
civil and political rights - particularly rights that protect the individual from
government interference. That danger exists whether or not socio-economic
rights are based on legitimate models. Sadurski suggests that, the danger is
especially great in countries such as Poland, which are only just establishing
liberal-democratic institutions and inculcating respect for the rule of law. 2 16 It
would, indeed, be disastrous for Poland if the inclusion of socio-economic
"rights" in the 1997 Constitution "water[ed] down the effectiveness of other
rights, including those that have a determinate meaning as limits on state
action." 2 1
7
But Sadurski neglects Poland's novel effort to minimize the danger by
expressly distinguishing (in Article 8(2)) those rights that are self-executing and
directly enforceable from others, the scope of which must be determined in
subsequent legislation. If this provision is to have any significance at all,
reviewing courts will have to adopt different approaches and standards when
construing different "rights" under the Constitution. If they do, this should
prevent the inclusion of difficult-to-enforce socio-economic rights from eroding
the enforceability and actual enforcement of civil and political rights. However, it
remains to be seen whether the courts will adopt an appropriately bifurcated
approach to enforcing the Constitution's bifurcated system of rights.2 18
The Process of Enactment and Ratification
Finally, .what is the historical legitimacy of the process by which the 1997
Constitution was enacted and ratified? As we saw in the Introduction, opponents
of the new Constitution objected not only to, the process by which it was enacted
and ratified but actually filed an unsuccessful lawsuit to have that process
declared null and void.2 19 They claimed that a constitution approved by less than
twenty-five percent of eligible voters (a 52.7 percent majority of the forty-six
percent of eligible voters who participated) could not legitimately constitute the
supreme law of the nation. 220 But if that is the case, then no constitution in Polish
history, including the revered 1791 Constitution, was legitimate.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See id. at 97 (citing.Ewa L4towska, Co to znaczy 'bezpo. rednie stosowanie konstytucji'
["What is Meant by 'Direct Applicability of the Constitution"'] Rzeczpospolita, Aug. 13, 1996, at 5).
219 See Opposition Leader Pessimistic About Referendum Result, supra note 9; Barker, supra
note 9; Political Dispute in Poland Continues Despite Referendum, supra note 9; KPN Files
Referendum Protest, supra note 10.
220 Id.
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In fact, the 1997 Constitution is the first in Poland's history to be subject to a
public referendum of any kind. All previous Polish constitutions were simply
enacted into law by National Assemblies, all of which, incidentally, were far less
democratic than the Assembly that enacted the 1997 Constitution. As we saw
earlier,22 1 the 1791 Constitution was not even enacted by the full National
Assembly; it was pushed through Parliament surreptitiously while two-thirds of
all Sejm deputies were away on vacation. Compared to any other constitution in
Polish history, the 1997 Constitution has a stronger claim to democratic
legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertions of its opponents, Poland's new Constitution does
not defy "Poland's history, heritage and traditions."2 22  Virtually all of its
provisions, including the controversial preamble, have roots in Poland's long
history of constitutionalism, extending back to, and even before, the sixteenth
century.
This conclusion is not likely to stem the criticism of Poland's new
Constitution, however, because many of its critics are either ignorant of Poland's
constitutional history (beyond blind reverence to the 1791 Constitution) or they
consider historical arguments irrelevant. Indeed, many of their complaints about
the new Constitution have been personal-"The drafters of the Constitution did
not pay attention to me and my views"-or ideological-"Any constitution that
(a) does not recognize the supremacy of the Church and natural law and (b) was
drafted by (among others) former communists cannot be legitimate." Against
such personal and ideological complaints, no counter-arguments can possibly
persuade. After all, the legitimacy of any constitution is inherently a political
question and, therefore, always contestable.
Still, there is an abundance of historical data supporting the Constitution's
claim to legitimacy. The 1997 Constitution fits into Poland's indigenous-
sometimes glorious and sometimes tragic-history of constitutionalism.
However, the legitimacy of a constitution is not determined by historical
pedigree alone. When critics deny the legitimacy of Poland's new Constitution,
they are (explicitly or implicitly) making a prediction that Polish society will not
respect the Constitution in daily conduct. 223 Whether this prediction turns out to
be true or false ultimately will not depend on legal/constitutional theories of the
sixteenth-century, the 1791 Constitution, or any other document in Polish
constitutional history. Rather, as Ewa Lqtowska has suggested, 22 4 it will depend
on the political climate in which the new Constitution is implemented. Whether
221 See DAVIS, supra note 23, at 534; JEDRUCH, supra note 107.
222 See The Draft Constitution: An Acceptable Compromise, supra note 1.
223 In this respect, Pawel piewak, supra note 15 at 93, was quite right to tie in his criticisms
about Poland's new Constitution with a prediction about the future of the Constitution.
224 Letowska, supra note 14.
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Poland's political climate proves too unfavorable for the new Constitution to
survive remains to be seen. So far, however, even after important national
elections which significantly altered the balance of political power in Parliament
and the government, 225 the Constitution seems safe from imminent annulment or
replacement. Perhaps ordinary Poles have simply had enough of constitutional
politics for the time being. If soit would signify the end of Poland's most recent
"constitutional moment" and its return to (relatively speaking) "normal
politics. 2
26
225 In parliamentary elections held on September 21, 1997, the ruling SLD (former communist)
and PSL (peasant) parties were, in essence, defeated by the AWS (a coalition of parties led by
Solidarity trade union leader Marian Krzaklewski). Consequently, SLD and PSL's governing
coalition was replaced by a coalition between the AWS and the UW (the centrist, pro-reform party led
by Leszek Balcerowicz). See Christine Spolar, Moderate Coalition Forms Government in Poland;
Solidarity; Center-Left Parry to Share Power, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Prior to the elections, the AWS announced that it would seek to
amend the 1997 Constitution. Indeed, some of the coalition-partners argue that the elections
themselves constituted a second, and more legitimate referendum on the Constitution. However, the
AWS won too few seats to force through its constitutional amendments. See Coalition: New Conflicts
Ahead, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, May 29, 1998, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
Consequently, if the elections were a second referendum on the Constitution, the results were, at best,
inconclusive. In any case, the AWS has so far only attempted to enact one minor amendment that
would limit the immunity from prosecution of members of Parliament. See AWS Seeks to Amend
Constitution, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Jan. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
This hardly represents the kind of large-scale amendment party-leaders promoted during the 1997
election campaign. Interestingly, there has been virtually no mention of large-scale amendments to the
Constitution since the AWS-UW coalition government took office (under terms of the 1997
Constitution) in mid-November 1997.
226 See generally I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). See also,
Poland's Political Scene: Stable at Last?, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Aug. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwid File; Elizabeth Pond, Miracle on.the Vistula, 21(3) WASH. U. L.Q. 209 (1998),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (noting how the AWS, whose leader Marian
Krzaklewski referred to the UW as "traitors" for failing to include strong Catholic language in the
Constitution, is now "cohabiting with these 'traitors."').
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